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ABSTRACT
This Article uses public school naming rights as a lens through
which to examine the conflicts between the tempestuous First
Amendment categories of government speech, commercial speech, and
forum analysis. Courts and scholars have noted the internal conflicts
within these three categories, but have not yet explored the conflicts
between them. As the growth of school naming rights shows,
government sponsorship arrangements collapse the artificial divisions
between the categories and demand a better understanding of their
interactions. This Article represents a first attempt to bring coherence to
these poorly defined and increasingly important areas of First
Amendment law.
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INTRODUCTION
Like many public school administrators, Brooklawn School
Board President Bruce Darrow was stuck in a bind. His schools needed
renovations, but his budget was already stretched to the breaking point.
Where most administrators might have gone to the county or state
government to ask for more funding, however, Darrow hit on what
seemed like a novel solution: He decided to sell the naming rights to the
elementary school gym. Darrow found a sponsor almost immediately,
and Brooklawn’s elementary students now play dodgeball in the newlyrefurbished ShopRite of Brooklawn Center, named for the grocery store
which paid $100,000 to help renovate it.1 School boards across the
country soon followed Brooklawn’s lead, entering into naming rights
deals whose combined value now stretches into the hundreds of
millions.
A closer look at these deals and the policies governing them
suggests that school boards might inadvertently be steering themselves
into troubled constitutional waters. Specifically, schools may find it
increasingly hard to reject undesirable sponsors without running afoul of
the First Amendment. Indeed, the sale of public school naming rights
creates something of a perfect storm of First Amendment jurisprudence,
uniquely positioned at the juncture of three particularly tempestuous
areas of law: government speech, commercial speech, and schoolhouse
speech (a brand of forum analysis). Courts and scholars have not yet
acknowledged the shadow cast by this ominous storm, but as school
sponsorship deals become commonplace it will soon be increasingly
difficult to ignore.
This Article represents a first attempt to analyze the First
Amendment implications of school naming rights sales and the overlap
and interaction between government speech, commercial speech, and
schoolhouse speech (a type of forum analysis). Scholars have focused
much attention on the characteristics which separate these three
categories from fully protected speech,2 but comparatively little
1

Tamar Lewin, In Public Schools, The Name Game as a Donor Lure, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 26, 2006, at A1; Robert Strauss, Education: P.S. (Your Name Here), N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 2001, § 14 (New Jersey Weekly), at 6.
2
Following Melville Nimmer’s lead, many First Amendment scholars have
employed “definitional balancing” or “categorical balancing” as a means for “defining
which forms of speech are to be regarded as ‘speech’ within the meaning of the First
Amendment.” Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak Times to Time: First
Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935,
942 & n.24 (1968); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L.
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attention has been paid to the overlap and interactions between the
categories themselves. The growth of public sponsorship deals such as
school naming rights demand a better understanding of these
interactions. In an attempt to meet that need, this Article creates a
framework to analyze school naming rights specifically, and
government speech, commercial speech, and schoolhouse speech more
generally. The purpose of the Article is not to advocate for or against
regulations of public school naming rights, but rather to illuminate paths
through the problematic thicket of Constitutional issues those
regulations inevitably raise. In doing so, it clarifies – and in some cases
attempts to define – the boundaries between categories of First
Amendment law which up until now have led independent and troubled
careers, but which contemporary developments have put on an
inevitable and dramatic collision course.
Part I of the Paper gives an overview of trends in schoolhouse
commercialism, explaining how the growth of commercialism in
schools throughout the 1980s and 1990s led directly to the more recent
practice of selling naming rights. Because the categorization of “speech”
for First Amendment purposes depends on both the identity of the
speaker and the content and purpose of the message the speaker delivers,
this Part explores not only the shape of naming rights arrangements but
also the motivations behind them. It concludes by identifying the
concerns that drive attempts to limit naming rights or exclude certain
sponsors. Building on the practice and debate described in Part I, Part II
describes the actual polices by which school boards have tried to claim
control over naming rights arrangements. Though diverse in their
approaches, these policies are uniformly blind to the First Amendment
problems they raise. It appears, in fact, that most naming rights sales are
made without reference to any written policy whatsoever, putting school
boards in a calamitously weak position to defend against the First
Amendment challenges they will inevitably face. Part III builds the
constitutional framework. This final Part uses naming rights as a tool to
illuminate and clarify the tangled interactions among government
speech, commercial speech, and school speech doctrine. Embracing a
REV. 46, 47 & n.3 (1987); Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1095, 1138 n.175 (2005); see also John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Study in
the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1482, 1500 & n.74 (1975) (describing a “categorization” approach). See
generally Norman T. Deutsch, Professor Nimmer Meets Professor Schauer (and
Others): An Analysis of “Definitional Balancing” as a Methodology for Determining
the “Visible Boundaries of the First Amendment”, 39 AKRON L. REV. 483 (2006)
(examining “definitional balancing” as a method for separating protected and
unprotected speech).
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task that courts will soon have to face, this Part attempts to resolve some
of the problematic overlaps between the categories’ definitions and
governing standards. It also argues that some of the border disputes
between these three areas of First Amendment law may be impossible to
resolve so long as the categories themselves begin from fundamentally
different premises. Because government speech is defined and governed
by speaker identity, commercial speech by the speech’s content, and
schoolhouse speech by the forum where it is delivered, their
simultaneous application creates unprecedented and intractable
problems.
I. FROM SPONSORSHIP TO NAMING RIGHTS: TRENDS AND ISSUES IN
SCHOOLHOUSE COMMERCIALISM
While the naming rights debate has thus far been driven by
concerns over policy and educational outcomes, the issues which
animate that discussion – including sponsor identity, motivation, and
message – are also necessary components of any First Amendment
analysis.
A. The Growth of Schoolhouse Commercialism
Schoolhouse commercialism is growing in nearly all its forms,
from exclusive pouring rights arrangements to sponsored classroom
materials mixing advertising with educational messages.3 One recent
study found that schools receive $2.4 billion a year from corporate
relationships,4 more than the total 2003 educational expenditures of ten
states and the District of Columbia.5 The numbers for individual school
districts can be simply staggering, rivaling the amounts of funding they
3

ALEX MOLNAR, CTR. FOR THE ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIALISM IN EDUC.,
SPONSORED SCHOOLS AND COMMERCIALIZED CLASSROOMS: SCHOOLHOUSE
COMMERCIALIZING TRENDS IN THE 1990’S, 6-7 (1998) [hereinafter MOLNAR,
SPONSORED SCHOOLS]; id. at 26 (“The evidence presented in this report suggests that
the 1990’s have become the decade of sponsored schools and commercialized
classrooms.”); see also Alex Molnar, Sixth Annual Report on Commercialism in
Schools: Cashing in on the Classroom, EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP MAGAZINE, Dec.
2003-Jan. 2004, at 79, 79 [hereinafter Molnar, Cashing in on the Classroom] (reporting
“marked increase” in six categories of schoolhouse commercialism from 2001-2002 to
2002-2003).
4
Molnar, Cashing in on the Classroom, supra note 3, at 79.
5
George A. Clowes, Just the Facts: Teacher Salaries and Education Spending,
REFORM
NEWS,
May
1,
2004,
available
at
SCHOOL
http://www.heartland.org/Article.cfm?artId=14818.
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receive from taxes and other public sources.6
Opponents of the practice bemoan public schools “selling out” to
corporate sponsors,7 and argue that children are particularly vulnerable
to harmful advertising,8 especially from junk food and soda companies
marketing unhealthy snacks and sodas to a student population already
struggling with obesity.9 But despite occasional victories against such
direct marketing, opponents of schoolhouse commercialism increasingly
seem to be fighting a rearguard action. Occasionally, their battles make
headlines. In perhaps the best-known example, Greenbrier High School
in Evans, Georgia, sparked a national firestorm of criticism when it
suspended a student for wearing a Pepsi t-shirt to a Coke-sponsored
rally.10 The public outcry targeted both the heavy-handed suspension
and the commercial interests it apparently served.11
B. The New and Growing Market: Selling Naming Rights to School
Facilities
Despite this bitter opposition, commercial activity in schools was
well-entrenched by the end of the 1990s. Naming rights, in fact, were
one of the few areas of commercial activity that did not experience
growth. But as school leaders sat on the sidelines, contemplating their
own tight budgets and watching millions of corporate dollars flow to
other entities through naming rights arrangements, it became almost
inevitable that they would join the game.12 In doing so, they followed –
6

See, e.g., Izzy Gould, What’s in a Name? Extra Cash, Perhaps, TAMPA TRIB.,
Dec. 21, 2004 (Sports), at 1.
7
See, e.g., Ruth Sheehan, Too Late to Cry ‘Sellout’, NEWS AND OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 20, 2003, at B1.
8
See Lini S. Kadaba, Museums Embrace Corporate Sponsorship, PHILADELPHIA
INQ., Aug. 9, 2001.
9
See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN CHILDHOOD
OBESITY
(2004),
http://www.kff.org/entmedia/upload/The-Role-of-Media-inChildhood-Obesity.pdf.
10
See, e.g., Jingle Davis, No Coke, Pepsi: Rebel Without a Pause, ATLANTA
CONSTITUTION, March 26, 1998, (Constitution Edition), at 1A; Guy Friddel, Student’s
Act of Cola Defiance Was Refreshing, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk, Va.), Apr. 4, 1998,
at 1B; Carl Hiassen, Be True to Your School … and Its Cola, CHARLESTON GAZETTE
(Charleston, S.C.), Mar. 31, 1998, at 4A.
11
See, e.g., Editorial: Pepsi T-Shirt Wasn’t a Huge Crime, OMAHA WORLDHERALD, Mar. 29, 1998, at 20A; Barry Saunders, OK, Class – Line Up, Dress Right,
and Salute the Image, NEWS AND OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.) Mar. 28, 1998, at A19.
12
As one school fundraiser commented after being told that his high school was
only the second in the country to negotiate a naming rights deal, “We thought everyone
did this. I thought this was a fairly routine thing. We’re pioneers, I guess.” Chris
Anderson, Naming Rights to Pay for Lights, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., (Sarasota,
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sometimes explicitly13 – in the footsteps of universities,14 museums,15
and professional sports teams,16 all of which commonly emblazon the
names of large sponsors on their buildings and facilities. Despite
occasional controversies between the entities involved,17 and some
public opposition,18 these arrangements have generally been considered
successful. Indeed, local governments have increasingly tried to mimic
private deals by selling advertising space on city buses and police cars,19
as well as naming rights to public libraries,20 public stadiums, and office
buildings.21 By 2000, when Brooklawn signed its deal with Shop Rite,
public schools seemed to be the only place where naming rights
arrangements were not common.22

Fla.), Feb. 18, 2004, at C1.
13
Sue Kiesewetter, The Name Game; Sale of Naming Rights for Sports Facilities
in Schools; Includes Tips on Selling Naming Rights, SCHOOL PLANNING AND
MANAGEMENT, Aug. 1998, at 29; Jason Spencer, What’s in a name? Lots of cash,
HISD hopes; District ponders a proposal to sell naming rights for football stadiums,
THE HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 21, 2005, (Star Edition), at A-01.
14
See Dan Voelpel, Pay the Price and It’s (Your Name Here) Stadium; The
Modern Advertising Trend of Selling Rights to Sports Facilities Has Trickled Down to
High Schools, for Better or Worse, THE NEWS TRIBUNE, (Tacoma, Wash.), May 22,
2005, at D01.
15
Kadaba, supra note 8.
16
See, e.g., Cindy Brovsky, Stadium Naming Rights Are Usually a Package Deal,
THE DENVER POST, Oct. 29, 2000, (2d Ed.), at A-04. In an interesting reversal of the
normal practice described in this Article, see Goldie Blumenstyk, U. of Phoenix Buys
Naming Rights to a Pro-Football Stadium, CHRON. OF HIGHER ED., Oct. 6, 2006, at 30.
17
Many of these disputes center on contractual issues which are not addressed in
any detail here. For more information, see generally Robert H. Thornburg, Note,
Stadium Naming Rights: An Assessment of the Contract and Trademark Issues
Inherent to Both Professional and Collegiate Stadiums, 2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 328
(2003); Debra E. Blum, Donors Increasingly Use Legal Contracts to Stipulate
Demands on Charities, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Mar. 21, 2002, at 9; see also John K.
Eason, Private Motive and Perpetual Conditions in Charitable Naming Gifts: When
Good Names Go Bad, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 375, 402-03 (2005) (describing common
conflicts in charitable naming arrangements, and proposing state law solutions).
18
See, e.g., Cindy Brovsky, We’ll Call it Mile High, DENVER POST, Aug. 8, 2001;
Vincent P. Bzdek, The Ad Subtractors, Making a Difference, WASH. POST, July 29,
2003, at C09.
19
Jason Bradley Kay, What is a Good Name Worth? Local Government
Sponsorships and the First Amendment, POPULAR GOV’T, Fall 2003, at 30, 30, 35.
20
Name Games Question, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 9, 2005, at 8B (reporting
mixed public response to a plan to sell naming rights to city library).
21
Kay, supra note 19, at 30.
22
Molnar’s 1998 report cited “Appropriation of Space” as a small and shrinking
category of commercial activity in schools. Molnar, Sponsored Schools, supra note 3,
at 28.
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Within a few months of the Brooklawn deal,23 dozens – if not
hundreds – of public schools were entering into naming rights
arrangements,24 most of them involving football stadiums and other
athletic facilities.25 But even years after the practice had become
commonplace, many people continued to regard naming rights deals
with considerable suspicion. In California, when school boards
responded to 2003 state budget cuts by openly considering naming
rights arrangements, local newspapers called the move “unprecedented”
and “radical.”26 Three years earlier, they would have been right.
Over time, however, the sale of school naming rights has become
something of a professional enterprise. In Texas, school districts sent
written solicitations to local and national businesses offering naming
rights to school stadiums.27 Although most of the early naming rights
arrangements were for athletic fields, schools soon began selling off
naming rights to libraries,28 hallways29 and other facilities. Many public
schools began to imitate universities30 by openly soliciting naming
rights deals and announcing a menu of prices for naming rights to
various school facilities: $1 million for a building, $25,000 for a
classroom, and so on.31 In just a few short years, the sale of public
23

Lewin, supra note 1; Strauss, supra note 1. Some reports indicate that naming
rights were sold as early as 1995, but Brooklawn’s deal is generally recognized as the
first. See, e.g., Kiesewetter, supra note 13.
24
ALEX MOLNAR, COMMERCIALISM IN EDUC. RESEARCH UNIT, THE FIFTH
ANNUAL REPORT ON TRENDS IN SCHOOLHOUSE COMMERCIALISM: WHAT’S IN A NAME?
THE CORPORATE BRANDING OF AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 7 (2002) [hereinafter MOLNAR,
WHAT’S IN A NAME?] (reporting dramatic increase in news citations of naming rights
sales).
25
Lewin, supra note 1.
26
Jeff Donaldson, Some Schools Mull Sale of Naming Rights to Raise Funds, THE
DESERT SUN (Palm Springs, Cal.), Feb. 4, 2003, at 1B.
27
Anita Powell, Round Rock ISD Looks to Sell Stadium Name, AUSTIN AMERICAN
STATESMAN (Austin, Tex.), Oct. 30, 2003; Spencer, supra note 13.
28
Geoff Mulvihill, N.J. School Sells Naming Rights to Raise Money, AM. MKTG
ASS’N MKTG NEWS TM, May 15, 2004, (Nation), at 7.
29
Roundtable: Voting Rights, Treason, School Names (NPR Radio Broadcast, July
20, 2006) (reporting sales in a Wisconsin school district).
30
Universities often have elaborate and specific naming rights policies which
address the criteria for naming school facilities, including the amounts which must be
donated and the methods by which donors will be selected. See, e.g, UNIV. OF N. MEX.
BD. OF REGENTS, POLICY MANUAL, 2.11: NAMING UNIVERSITY FACILITIES, SPACES,
ENDOWMENTS, AND PROGRAMS, available at http://www.unm.edu/~brpm/r211.htm
(last visited Aug. 7, 2006); N.C. STATE UNIV., POLICY 03.00.2: CRITERIA AND
PROCEDURES FOR NAMING FACILITIES AND PROGRAMS, available at
http://www.ncsu.edu/policies/alumni_dev/POL03.002.php (last visited July 13, 2006).
31
Lewin, supra note 1; see also Leif Strickland, Extra Credit for School Donors;
For the Right Amount, HP Will Make You a Big Name on Campus, DALLAS MORNING
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school naming rights had developed from fodder for humor columnists32
into a multi-million dollar industry that involves schools, students, and
sponsors nationwide.
C. Funding, Charity, and Commerce: Motivations Behind the Sale and
Purchase of School Naming Rights
Two inexorable forces have driven the spread of naming rights
arrangements: schools’ need for funding, and companies’ desire for
advertising.33 Given these somewhat mixed messages, it can be difficult
to determine whether public school naming rights deals should be
described as a commercial transaction, a charitable donation, or even
some kind of educational or political speech.
For school administrators, at least, the motivation for selling
naming rights is relatively straightforward: money.34 Naming rights are
a relatively plentiful and valuable asset that every school possesses. And
unlike corporate-sponsored educational materials, naming rights do not
necessarily require schools to change their daily routines or curricula.35
Faced with the prospect of this “free money,” school administrators may
find it impossible – and unnecessary – to resist. Paul Vallas, chief
executive of the Philadelphia public schools, is unabashed in his support
for naming rights deals: “My approach is Leave No Dollar Behind.
There are tremendous needs in this system, where 85 percent of the kids
are below poverty level. I’m not uncomfortable with corporations giving
us money and getting their names on things. As long as it’s not
inappropriate, I don’t see any downside.”36
NEWS, Feb. 27, 2002, at 1A (listing asking prices for school facilities in Texas’
Highland Park school district); Lisa Marie Pane, School Raises Funds by Selling Name
Rights, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City, UT), Aug. 10, 2001, at A10 (listing prices for
school facilities in Newport, Rhode Island).
32
Elizabeth Chang, A School By Any Other Name Would Be … Richer, WASH.
POST, Dec. 12, 1999, at B05; Editorial: So What’s Next, Nike Elementary?, THE
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), March 29, 1998, at 16B.
33
Judy Keen, Wis. Schools Find Corporate Sponsors; Cafeterias, Gyms, More
Renamed to Nab Easy Cash, USA TODAY, July 28, 2006, at 3A.
34
Gould, supra note 6; MOLNAR, SPONSORED SCHOOLS, supra note 3, at 10 (“The
justification for the sponsorship agreements most often used by educators is the need
for money.”).
35
See infra note 127 and accompanying text for discussion of whether a school’s
name can be considered part of its “curriculum.”
36
Lewin, supra note 1; see also Joseph Di Bona et al., Commercialism in North
Carolina High Schools: A Survey of Principals’ Perceptions, 78 PEABODY J. OF EDUC.
41, 56 (2003) (reporting high school principals’ positive impressions of corporate
sponsored events).
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Although school administrators’ reasoning may be
straightforward, purchasers’ motivations are somewhat more complex,
involving a complicated mixture of private and public interest.37 Nearly
all naming rights purchasers are companies and other for-profit
entities,38 and many insist that their purchases are motivated by a desire
to “be part of the community. If we get some recognition from it, more
power to it.”39
But it seems implausible that corporate purchasers of naming
rights are motivated purely by altruism.40 Corporate directors, after all,
have fiduciary duties to improve the company’s bottom line, not to
pursue philanthropy.41 As one petitioner recently argued to the United
States Supreme Court in a First Amendment case: “All corporate speech
is, and should be, uttered in the interest of benefiting the corporation in
the eyes of potential consumers.”42 The fact that sponsors ask for
37

Business Partnerships with Schools, POLICY REPORT, Fall 2001, at 1 (quoting a
Verizon manager as saying that the company’s “commitment to education is driven by
its responsibility as a good corporate citizen and by the understanding that today’s
students will be tomorrow’s employees, consumers, regulators, and neighbors.”). For
an interesting attempt to classify corporate involvement with school reform according
to the motivations of the corporations involved, see R.A. Mickelson, International
Business Machinations: A Case Study of Corporate Involvement in Local Education
COLLEGE
RECORD
476,
491-96
(1999),
Reform,
100
TEACHERS
http://www.uncc.edu/rmicklsn/images/corporate.pdf.
38
Research for this Article revealed only two examples of public high school
facilities named after individual, non-corporate financial donors. Alan Schmadtke,
Stadium Naming Is Big Business: Corporate Money is Dictating the Names of College
and Even High School Facilities, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 25, 2006, at D1.
39
Christine McDonald, Got Cash? Buy School Name; To Ease Tight Budgets,
Plymouth-Canton, Others Ponder Sale of Naming Rights to Buildings, Events, THE
DETROIT NEWS, June 27, 2005, at 1A (quoting president of a company that had
donated $25,000 for a playground).
40
See Eric A. Posner, Law and Society & Law and Economics: Common Ground,
Irreconcilable Differences, New Directions: Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of
Gifts and Gratuitous Promises, 1997 WIS. L. REV 572, 572-85 (arguing that altruism
“is an insufficient explanation for gift-giving behavior” generally, and exploring other
rationales such as trust and status enhancement).
41
In the seminal corporate philanthropy case, the Delaware Court of Chancery
“[c]onclude[d] that the test to be applied in passing on the validity of a gift such as the
one here in issue is that of reasonableness, a test in which the provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code pertaining to charitable gifts by corporations furnish a helpful guide.”
Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (1969). Even so, nearly all
states have passed statutes allowing corporations to make charitable donations even
without demonstrating their value to the company. Jill E. Fisch, Fundamental Themes
in Business Law Education: Teaching Corporate Governance Through Shareholder
Litigation, 34 GA. L. REV. 745, 765 (2000).
42
Brief for Arthur W. Page Soc’y et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (No. 02-575), at 19.
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naming rights, as opposed to simply making an anonymous or
restriction-free donation,43 suggests that the naming rights themselves
are intended to serve as advertising, just like the naming rights to
professional sports stadiums.
Although many corporate sponsors insist on the philanthropy
explanation, others’ public statements lend support to the naming rightsas-advertising theory. After paying $504,000 to rename a Tacoma high
school football stadium after his Chevrolet dealership, Jerry Yoder made
the point quite clearly: “If people went to that stadium, and it said
Riverside Ford Stadium, where do you think people would to go buy
their cars? What if it said Korum Ford?”44 Yoder’s business partner at
Sunset Chevrolet added, “It’s hard to measure, but we think we’re
getting more than our money’s worth.”45 Even opponents of naming
rights arrangements agree with that.46 Although the opportunity to
expose those children to a corporate brand throughout every school day
may not immediately result in an upswing of sales for a particular
product, corporate donors know that such exposure can over time
generate feelings of familiarity, goodwill, and even loyalty towards the
company and its products.
Of course, school administrators might not care why a particular
sponsor chooses to purchase naming rights, so long as its check clears.
But although a corporate sponsor’s commercial motives may not affect
the value of its dollars, they do shape the First Amendment protections
to which it is entitled, as described in Part III. They also add fuel to
critics who allege that naming rights deals are simply another form of
insidious schoolhouse commercialism.
D. Concerns Raised by the Sale of Naming Rights
The spread of naming rights arrangements, like the schoolhouse
commercialism that helped spawn them, has inspired skepticism and
even strong opposition. Perhaps the most immediately apparent concern
with an open naming policy is the possibility of a “bad name” sponsor

43

MOLNAR, WHAT’S IN A NAME?, supra note 24, at 2.
Voelpel, supra note 14.
45
Id.; see also Keen, supra note 33; Molnar, WHAT’S IN A NAME?, supra note 24,
at 16.
46
Lewin, supra note 1; see also Tamara R. Piety, Free Advertising: The Case for
Public Relations as Commercial Speech, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 367, 374 (2006)
(“When a newspaper carries a company’s ‘message’ it is better than any advertising
because it is both free and more credible to the public than it would be coming directly
from the company.”).
44
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emblazoning its name on the side of a public school.47 Would-be
sponsors who sell products considered inappropriate for children are
clear candidates for this categorization, and indeed many school
administrators have already stated that they will not seek or accept such
deals.48 And although it may seem unlikely that a truly villainous
character would maliciously bid on the right to name a public school,
nightmare scenarios are more likely than school boards might suspect.49
To take just one example, the Ku Klux Klan recently attempted to
become an acknowledged sponsor of a Missouri public radio station50
and a stretch of Missouri road as part of the “Adopt a Highway”
program.51 Both times the Klan was predictably rejected by the
responsible state agency, and both times it mounted a constitutional
challenge. And although the Klan lost its claim against the public radio
station, it won the right to be included in Missouri’s Adopt a Highway
program, much to the horror of the program’s directors.52
Horror stories from the world of private sponsorship suggest that
concerns about “bad name” sponsors are quite real. Even a seemingly
harmless naming rights arrangement can go sour when a sponsor’s
business or personal conduct is later called into question. High profile
examples are not hard to find. Baseball fans remember that in 1999,
Houston’s new major league ballpark was christened Enron Field, after
the energy giant paid $100 million for 30 years of naming rights. Two
years later, Enron CEO Ken Lay was a disgraced and widely reviled
47

Kay, supra note 19, at 30 (internal citation omitted). See generally Eason, supra
note 17.
48
See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 1.
49
See, Eason, supra note 17, at 387, 394-402 (discussing specific examples of
“charitably inclined malfeasants whose names now adorn various charitable
institutions or facilities across the nation”); John Kass, If This Group Is Involved, It’s a
Really Bad Sign, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 14, 2005, at C2 (reporting National Man-Boy Love
Association’s adoption of a highway in Illinois); Editorial: County Should Have
Rejected Nazis, THE OREGONIAN (Portland, Or.), Feb. 4, 2005, (Sunrise Edition), at
B10 (reporting that county, fearing lawsuits, allowed American Nazi Party to adopt a
stretch of highway).
50
See Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the University of Missouri, 203
F.3d 1085, 1094 (8th Cir. 2000).
51
Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 702 (8th Cir. 2000).
52
Cuffley was decided on Equal Protection grounds, but the court specifically
noted that “[w]hether this claim arises under the Equal Protection Clause or the First
Amendment, it is clear that the State may not deny access to the Adopt-A-Highway
program based on the applicant’s views.” Id. at 760 n.3. But see Texas v. Knights of
the Ku Klux Klan, 58 F.3d 1075 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that state’s reason for
denying the Klan’s application to adopt a portion of highway outside a public housing
project was reasonable and viewpoint neutral, since the state sought to prevent the
Klan from intimidating residents and frustrating a federal desegregation order).
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figure, the company itself was in the middle of a catastrophic
bankruptcy that cost thousands of Houstonians their jobs, and the Astros
were scrambling to buy out the remainder of the naming rights contract
for $2.1 million.53 Lay and Enron are by no means the only high-profile
donors whose naming rights deals have caused financial and image
problems for donees.54
Of course, the “bad name” scenario is not the only objection to
naming rights, and may not even be the most serious. Echoing the anticommercialism arguments made throughout the 1990s, opponents of
school naming rights deals argue that emblazoning corporate names on
public school facilities demeans the schools,55 “cheapens the honor
bestowed on long-time public servants and civic leaders when a facility
is named for them,”56 and interferes with schools’ primary mission of
educating students.57 These critics bolster their arguments with evidence
suggesting that younger children are cognitively incapable of
recognizing advertising for what it is,58 and are thus particularly
susceptible to seeing a company’s name on their school as an
endorsement of the company and a part of their educational
experience.59 The Children’s Museum of Cleveland received a dramatic
illustration of this point after it sold its naming rights to a local hospital.
53

The rights were later re-sold to Minute Maid, a subsidiary of Coca Cola, which
paid $100 million for 28 years of naming rights. See also Lay’s Alma Mater Struggles
With Donation: Seeks ‘Alternative Use’ for Stock Profits Instead of Economics
Position, MSNBC.Com, May 26, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12992280/.
54
See e.g., Shannon Allen, Jubilee Hall, SETON HALL MAGAZINE, Nov. 1, 2005,
available
at
http://www.shu.edu/news/magazine/2005-fallstatic/2005_fall_hallmark5.html; Jeffrey N. Gangemi, Tyco Conviction Leads to
WEEK
ONLINE,
Sept.
25,
2005,
Renaming,
BUS.
http://www.businessweek.com/bschools/content/sep2005/bs20050925_7716.htm; John
R. Wilke & Chad Terhune, Scrushy May Be Indicted Today, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4,
2003, at A3; Rick Wills, Naming Rights Issue on Table, PITTSBURGH TRIB. REV., Sept.
19, 2004.
55
Strickland, supra note 31 (quoting a school board member as saying that selling
naming rights would “cheapen” the school district).
56
Larry King, The World-Herald’s Priority is What Best Serves the Readers,
OMAHA WORLD HERALD (Neb.), Aug. 10, 2003, at 11b (explaining newspaper’s
decision to call a convention center by its popular name despite a recent sale of naming
rights); see also Mark Zaloudek, Should Donors Get to Name Public Schools?,
SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE (Florida), Mar. 21, 2005, at E1.
57
CITIZENS’ CAMPAIGN FOR COMMERCIAL-FREE SCHOOLS, WHAT’S WRONG WITH
COMMERCIALIZING
THE
PUBLIC
SCHOOLS?
(undated)
available
at
http://www.scn.org/cccs/arguments.html (last visited July 21, 2006); see also Eason,
supra note 17, at 399.
58
Kabada, supra note 8.
59
Spencer, supra note 13.
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As the museum’s executive director reported, “We had little children
getting off school buses and hanging onto the post outside afraid to
come in because they thought they had to get their shots.”60
Even putting aside this set of advertising-related concerns,
naming rights deals raise unexpected but difficult issues related to the
problem they are supposed to solve: funding. Naming rights
arrangements can threaten inter-school equity, since schools with a more
“marketable” student body – most likely schools situated in affluent
areas – are likely to draw the most attention from would-be corporate
donors.61 Though public schools are not obligated by the U.S.
Constitution to maintain districtwide equity,62 school administrators may
nonetheless be concerned that naming rights sales will exaggerate preexisting resource disparities.63 And even if naming rights deals do not
increase these funding gaps, some critics allege that they will, in the
long run, hurt school funding across the board. Those critics argue that
the sale of naming rights privatizes civic responsibility64 and makes
taxpayers less likely to vote for school funding measures in the future.65
As responsibility for public school funding moves to the private sector
and schools become more and more dependent on corporate dollars to
make ends meet, schools may find their own budgets and operations
subject to the financial health of corporate sponsors.66 And as the stories
of Enron, Tyco, and hundreds of dot-coms67 show, this can be a tenuous
position indeed.
The concerns described in this Part are for the most part matters
of policy, and the Constitution does not require school boards to address
them in any one particular way. Some school boards will strictly limit
the sponsors they will accept and the deals they enter into.68 Others will
60

Kadaba, supra note 8.
See Randy Krebs, Our View: Schools Should Think Before Entering Deal for
Naming Rights, ST. CLOUD TIMES (Minn.), July 19, 2005, at 5B (noting that a
technology company was focusing its school sponsorship efforts on “the nation’s
wealthiest school districts”).
62
See San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (rejecting Equal Protection
challenge to system of school finance based on local property taxes).
63
On the other hand, some see the sale of naming rights as a means to correcting
disparities between public and private institutions. See, Kiesewetter, supra note 13
(citing a public school official as saying, “All too often private donations go to private
schools – the Notre Dames and Harvards. Those donations only affect a small number
of people and have very little impact on the local community.”).
64
McDonald, supra note 39.
65
Business Partnerships with Schools, supra note 37, at 10.
66
Molnar, Sponsored Schools, supra note 3, at 8.
67
Thornburg, supra note 17, at 333.
68
Some schools have apparently achieved this by limiting not the sponsors, but the
61
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deny all corporate sponsorship of school activities and facilities.69 Most
will probably chart a middle course, seeking to limit naming rights but
not ban them.70 But although no specific course of action is
constitutionally mandated, some may be constitutionally prohibited. The
following Section sketches the contours of the most common policy
approaches to naming rights, concluding that school boards have not yet
addressed – nor even truly acknowledged – the First Amendment
implications of naming rights.
II. POLICY AND PRACTICE
Despite the prevalence of naming rights arrangements and the
weighty concerns they raise, few school boards have policies governing
their sale. Most facility-naming policies reflect the “traditional” method
of naming schools after community leaders or geographic features. Very
few address the selection of paying sponsors, or do so only in cursory
fashion.71 In short, the spread of naming rights arrangements has not
found an accurate – nor even approximate – reflection in school board
policies. This massive and growing gap is troubling both as a matter of
policy and as a matter of constitutional law.
To date, the closest that many school boards have come to an
actual naming rights policy is a public promise to avoid “bad” sponsors.
Struggling to identify the lines he would and would not cross in
choosing sponsors, Brooklawn School Board President Bruce Darrow
said, “Look, no one is suggesting us contracting with Delilah’s Den [a
local gentleman’s club]. We wouldn’t consider a product tie-in .… But
everyone uses food, so we contracted with a supermarket, a local
supermarket. We’re talking to local banks, people like that.”72 Following
facilities they put up for sale. McDonald, supra note 39.
69
In June 1999, in direct response to concerns about commercialism in schools,
San Francisco passed the “Commercial-Free Schools Act” to set limits on in-school
advertising. CTR. FOR COMMERCIAL-FREE PUB. EDUC., SAN FRANCISCO PASSES THE
COMMERCIAL-FREE SCHOOLS ACT, NOT FOR SALE (Spring 2000), available at
http://www.ibiblio.org/commercialfree/newsletters/n1300_1.html (last visited July 12,
2006).
70
See, e.g., CITIZENS’ CAMPAIGN FOR COMMERCIAL-FREE SCHOOLS,
CORPORATIONS LOSE BATTLE FOR SEATTLE SCHOOLS (Nov. 21, 2001), available at
http://www.asu.edu/educ/epsl/CERU/Articles/CERU-0111-060OWI.doc (last visited
July 12, 2006).
71
Though no complete survey of naming rights policies is yet available, only
44.3% of 174 public school principals in a recent North Carolina survey reported
having a policy in place for dealing with commercialism in schools. Di Bona et al.,
supra note 36, at 49.
72
Strauss, supra note 1.
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Darrow’s shaky example, few school boards have been able to articulate
the standards they use to select sponsors.73 One school administrator
attempted to explain his preference for Comcast as a sponsor by saying,
“Comcast is public in nature. What they do is related to what we do.
And a lot of our events are televised out of that building. There’s a good
synergy with us.”74 Without written policies to guide them, school
administrators are limited to such vague statements of preference.
Part of the problem may be a simple policy lag, as school boards
struggle to update their written rules to reflect current practice. Indeed,
until the sale of naming rights became prevalent in recent years, schools
were generally named after geographic or other area-specific features,75
or historical figures such as US Presidents. Prior to 2000, nearly all
school board policies were based on this model, which left no room for
sponsorships or other commercial naming rights deals. The only
significant deviations were those policies which called for community
nomination or the creation of a naming committee.76 This democratic
variant was almost certainly not intended to enable corporate naming
deals, however, and in any case would be an unwieldy tool for doing so.
73

See, e.g., Zaloudek, supra note 56 (reporting that Philadelphia schools refuse
naming rights deals with alcohol or tobacco companies). Even Brooklawn’s articulated
standard, which seems uncontroversial as a matter of policy, may be constitutionally
questionable. See Mary Jean Dolan, The Special Public Purpose Forum and
Endorsement Relationships: New Extensions of Government Speech, 31 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 71, 83 (2004) (“While a ‘commercial ads only’ policy does block most
speech against public policy, it is an open question whether governments can further
exclude a subset of such speech, typically alcohol and tobacco ads, where promoting
such products contravenes the administration’s values.”) (internal citation omitted).
74
Schmadtke, supra note 38; see also id.
75
See, e.g., BELLINGHAM (WASH.) SCH. DIST., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 501:
NAMING OF NEW SCHOOLS/FACILITIES (adopted Oct. 26, 1995), available at
http://www.bham.wednet.edu/policies/9250Policy.htm; DURHAM (N.C.) PUB. SCH.,
REGULATION 6090: NAMING PUBLIC SCHOOLS, available at http://www.dspnc.net
(search “6090”) (revised 1999).
76
See, e.g., BELLINGHAM SCH. DIST., supra note 75; ROCHESTER (N.Y.) CITY SCH.
BD., POLICY MANUAL: NAMING FACILITIES REGULATION 7500-R (adopted Aug. 20,
1998)
available
at
http://www.rcsdk12.org/BOE/PM/PM%20pdfs/7000/7500%20Naming%20Facilities.p
df (same); BUNCOMBE COUNTY (N.C.) BD. OF EDUC., POLICY # 535 (adopted Dec. 9,
1993)
available
at
http://www.buncombe.k12.nc.us/modules/Downloads/files/namschl535ar.pdf; BD. OF
EDUC. OF ARUNDEL COUNTY (MD.), POLICY # 706 (revised Nov. 20, 1989), available
at
http://www.aacps.org/aacps/boe/board/newpolicy/Sections/section_700/adminreg706.p
df (providing for a naming committee); BROCKPORT (KY.) CENTRAL SCH. DIST.,
POLICY 5850, NAMING SCHOOL FACILITIES, (revised Apr. 20, 2004) available at
http://brockport.k12.ny.us/policies.cfm?pid=151.
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Nevertheless, modern naming rights arrangements can directly trace
their lineage to certain elements of the traditional policies and their
democratic cousins. Specifically, some traditional-style policies allow
facilities to be named after specific (even living) individuals who have
made some significant “contribution” to the school or community.77
Although these policies usually refer only to “persons” or “individuals”
and are silent with regard to companies and other entities,78 they
implicitly acknowledge that the names of schools and school facilities
could be used to reward contributors to the school. By doing so, they set
the stage for the evolution of a more modern policy approach.
Many modern policies, clearly drawing on the “contribution”
variant of the traditional model, specifically acknowledge that a
financial donation to the school system could satisfy the “contribution”
requirement79 and override otherwise applicable naming rules.80 In
77

See, e.g., SHENANDOAH COUNTY (VA.) PUB. SCH., NAMING SCHOOL FACILITIES
(adopted
Jan.
14,
1997)
available
at
http://www.shenandoah.k12.va.us/pdf/policymanual/Sec%20F%2005-06.pdf;
HERMISTON (OR.) SCH. DIST., POLICY 8R: NAMING OF SCHOOL FACILITIES, ORS
332.107
(revised
Apr.
5,
2005),
available
at
http://policy.osba.org/hermiston/F/FF%20D1.PDF; EL PASO INDEP. SCH. DIST., POLICY
071902: NAMING SCHOOLS, OTHER FACILITIES, AND FUNCTION AREAS (adopted May
23, 2006), available at http://www.episd.org/Board/docs/policyalerts/alertpolicies/052006_alertpolicies/CWLocal.pdf; OXNARD (CAL.) UNION HIGH SCH. DIST. BD., POLICY
7310: NAMING EXISTING SCHOOL FACILITIES, (revised July 14, 2004) available at
(CAL.)
http://www.ouhsd.k12.ca.us/FLS/Policies/7000/b-p7310.pdf;
TORRANCE
UNIFIED SCH. DIST. BD., POLICY 7310: NAMING EXISTING SCHOOL FACILITIES,
(adopted
June
4,
2001)
(same)
available
at
http://www.tusd.org/pages/supt/BdPolicy/7000%20Torrance.pdf; JONESBORO (ARK.)
PUB. SCH. DIST., JOB CODE FF: NAMING OF SCHOOL FACILITIES, (adopted June 11,
2002) available at http://www.jps.k12.ar.us/Policy/FF.html.
78
CARTERET COUNTY (N.C.) PUB. SCH. SYS., REGULATION FF: NAMING SCHOOL
FACILITIES
(revised
Jan.
2006),
available
at
http://www.carteretcountyschools.org/hr/Facilities%20Development.pdf; SAINT LOUIS
BD. OF EDUC., POLICY 7600: NAMING OF SCHOOL FACILITIES (adopted July 24, 2001),
available at http://www.slps.org/Board_Education/policies/7600.htm. But see
MONONA GROVE (WIS.) SCH. DIST., BOARD POLICY 940: NAMING SCHOOL FACILITIES
(approved
July
8,
2003),
available
at
http://www.mgsd.k12.wi.us/locations/districtoffice/school_board/Policies/900/940.pdf
(allowing new facilities “to be named after an individual or entity if the individual or
entity is considered a major contributor to the Monona Grove School District.”).
79
VOLUSIA COUNTY (FLA.) SCH. DIST., POLICY 610 (effective Aug. 10, 2004);
HAW. BD. OF EDUC., POLICY 6750: NAMING OF SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL FACILITIES
(amended
Nov.
17,
2005),
available
at
http://lilinote.k12.hi.us/STATE/BOE/POL1.NSF (“School facilities may be named to
honor major benefactors whose significant contributions benefit the school, schoolcommunity, or public education.”)
80
PERRYSBURG (OHIO), POLICY 7110: NAMING SCHOOL FACILITIES, available at
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effect, they simply broaden the meaning of “contribution.” In addition to
redefining contribution, some also incorporate the democratic elements
of the traditional model, such as nominations and other community
input.81 In smaller ways, too, policy changes have paved the way for
naming rights sales. For example, many modern policies differentiate
between school facilities and the “areas within” them,82 often allowing
the sale of naming rights to the latter, but not the former.83 On the other
hand, a small subset of policies apparently recognize the prevalence of
the modern approach and take the opposite tack, creating a blanket bar
on the naming of school facilities after donors or commercial
enterprises.84 Finally, some policies essentially open the door for named
sponsors while reserving a specific process for rescinding that name
under circumstances such as the sponsor’s conviction for a felony or
crime involving moral turpitude.85 Although subtle, these policy changes
http://www.neola.com/perrysburg-oh/search/policities/po7110.htm (last visited July
13, 2006); COLUMBIA (MO.) SCH. DIST. NO. 93, POLICY FF: NAMING OF SCHOOL
FACILITIES,
(revised
Feb.
13,
2006)
available
at
http://www.columbia.k12.mo.us/policies/FF-S.pdf.
81
See, e.g., COBB COUNTY (GA.) SCH. DIST., ADMINISTRATIVE RULE FF: NAMING
SCHOOL
FACILITIES
(revised
Dec.
8,
2005),
available
at
OF
http://www.cobbk12.org/centraloffice/adminrules/F_Rules/Rule%20FF.htm; FAIRFAX
COUNTY (VA.) SCHOOL BOARD, POLICY 8170.1: NAMING SCHOOL FACILITIES AND
DEDICATING AREAS OF SCHOOL FACILITIES OR GROUNDS, (revised May 14, 2004)
available at http://www.fcps.edu/Directives/P8170.pdf; FALLS CHURCH CITY (VA.)
PUBLIC SCHOOLS, REGULATION 4.25: NAMING OF SPECIFIC AREAS OF SCHOOL
FACILITIES
(adopted
Jan
10,
2006),
available
at
http://www.fccps.k12.va.us/html/facilitiespolicies/4.25r.pdf (same).
82
See, e.g., COBB COUNTY, supra note 81.
83
See, e.g., SCH. DIST. OF PHILADELPHIA, POLICY 712: NAMING OF SCHOOL
DISTRICT
PROPERTIES
(revised
Feb.
22,
1994),
available
at
http://www.phila.k12.pa.us/offices/administration/policies/712.html; SCH. DIST. OF
WAUKESHA (WIS.), POLICY 9600G: GUIDELINES FOR NAMING OF SCHOOLS, FACILITIES
PROPERTIES
(amended
Oct.
11,
2000),
available
at
AND
http://www.waukesha.k12.wi.us/Library/lcumming/9600g.pdf. But see BROCKTON
(MASS.) PUB. SCH., COMMITTEE POLICY FF: NAMING SCHOOL BUILDINGS AND
FACILITIES,
2
(approved
Jan.
21,
2003),
available
at
http://www.brocktonpublicschools.com/administration/policy_manual/ff.html (“It is
the policy of the Brockton School Committee not to name a part or area of a building
facility, grounds, or parts thereof, once the building, facility, grounds or parts thereof
has been named for another individual person.”).
84
LOUDOUN COUNTY (VA.) SCH. BD., BYLAW 2-33: NAMING RIGHTS FOR SCHOOL
FACILITIES AND PROGRAMS (adopted May 25, 2004), available at
http://www.loudoun.k12.va.us/50975518115039/lib/50975518115039/Chapter%202/233.pdf; VENTURA (CAL.) UNIFIED SCH. DIST., BOARD POLICY 7511: NAMING OF
SCHOOL FACILITY, § 2.2 (adopted Oct. 27, 1992), available at
http://www.ventura.k12.ca.us/legalcounsel/id927.htm.
85
The author’s search found only one policy which allowed for rescinding a name,
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effectively allow – or, more accurately, acknowledge – a sea change in
way schools are named.
But even though some recently-amended policies recognize and
allow the sale of naming rights, the vast majority do not. The gap
between practice and policy, it seems, is wide and growing. Many
school boards have apparently interpreted the policies’ silence as an
implicit authorization, and have engaged in naming rights deals where
their own policies do not specifically prohibit them.86 Perhaps the most
common situation, however, involves districts whose policies allow
schools and school facilities to be named after those who have made a
“contribution” to the school or community. Some school boards might
argue that even independent of such a revision the contribution model is
broad enough to encompass financial donors. Few “contribution”
policies support such a reading, however, as most of them were clearly
drawn up to honor long-serving school employees or public servants. In
fact, most “contribution” policies refer only to “individuals”87 and often
specifically exclude living or non-retired persons.88 Nearly all
contemplate recognition of contributions to the “public welfare,”89
rather than the public fisc. Paid naming rights arrangements fit
awkwardly, if at all, into this model.
The First Amendment looms large in this gap between naming
rights policy and practice. For constitutional purposes, the most
disturbing aspect of the practice-policy gap is that it apparently reflects
and even then the policy applied only “in extraordinary circumstances” including the
sponsor being convicted of “a felony or of a crime involving moral turpitude” or whose
“name has become associated with violent activity.” CLARK COUNTY (NEV.) SCH.
DIST., POLICY 7223: NAMING OF EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES (revised April 22, 2004),
available at http://ccsd.net/directory/pol-reg/pdf/7223P.pdf; TENN. BD. OF REGENTS,
POLICY 4:02:05:01: NAMING BUILDINGS AND FACILITIES AND BUILDING PLAQUES
(Sept.
18,
1992),
available
at
http://www.tbr.state.tn.us/policies_guidelines/business_policies/4-02-5-01.htm.
86
See, e.g., Brandon Keat, Schools Gain Interest in Name Game, PITTSBURGH
TRIB. REV., Apr. 12, 2006 (describing a sale of school naming rights and noting that
“Mt. Lebanon School District has a rights policy, but it does not address corporate
sponsorship.”).
87
PITT COUNTY (N.C.) BD. OF EDUC., POLICY 5.401: NAMING SCHOOLS AND
ANCILLARY
FACILITIES
(reviewed
Oct.
2005),
available
at
http://www.pitt.k12.nc.us/boe/files/5/5.401_Naming_Schools_and_Ancillary_Facilitie
s.doc; FAIRFAX COUNTY (VA.) PUBLIC SCHOOLS REGULATION 8170.3, IV (effective
July 19, 2004), available at http://www.fcps.edu/Directives/R8170.pdf.
88
JEFFCO (COLO.) PUB. SCH., POLICY FF: NAMING OF SCHOOL FACILITIES (revised
Jan. 25, 2005), available at http://jeffcoweb.jeffco.k12.co.us/board/policies/ff.html.
89
MILWAUKEE PUB. SCH., ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY 5.01: FACILITIES, 6(A)
NAMING SCHOOL FACILITIES (revised Mar. 30, 2006), available at
http://www2.milwaukee.k12.wi.us/governance/rulespol/policies/PDF/CH05/5_01.pdf.
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the belief that a school board can sell naming rights without any
reference to any policy at all.90 If nothing else, it is clear that acting
outside of an established policy framework exposes school boards to
First Amendment challenges and simultaneously strips away their best
defenses.91
Moreover, simply creating policies to fill the practice-policy gap
is not enough. In order to shield a school board from First Amendment
challenges, a policy must also be followed once it is put into place.92
And as the discussion above indicates, school boards have thus far not
been particularly scrupulous about following their own written rules.
The policy review in this Part suggests that local school boards, like
other government actors before them,93 may be inadvertently wandering
into a First Amendment thicket. The following Part illuminates potential
paths through it.
III. A NEW FIRST AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK
Although school board officials generally see naming rights as a
90

Don Hunter, Assembly Alters Naming Policy; Public Places: Emphasis on the
Deceased When it Comes to City Parks, Facilities, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, June 21,
2006, at B1 (reporting that the Anchorage Assembly recently considered and then
specifically eliminated guidelines which would have given guidance to the sale of
naming rights to corporate or private investors, despite recognizing that the practice
does occur).
91
See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983) (applying “arbitrary and capricious” standard to agency action and finding that
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration failed to provide sufficient reasons
for its decision to abandon passive restraint requirements)
92
Courts in a number of First Amendment cases have found that the lack of
practical oversight over a particular policy was sufficient to create a public forum for
free speech. Christ’s Bride Ministries, Inc. v. SEPTA, 148 F.3d 242, 251 (3d Cir.
1998), cert. denied 525 U.S. 1068 (1999); Planned Parenthood Ass’n/Chicago Area v.
Chicago Transit Authority, 767 F.2d 1225, 1232 (7th Cir. 1985); see also, E. Timor
Action Network v. New York, 71 F. Supp. 2d 334, 338-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Nat’l
Abortion Rts. Fed’n v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 112 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1326
(N.D.Ga. 2000); AIDS Action Comm. of Mass., Inc. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 42
F.3d 1, 24-25 (1st Cir. 1994); see also FRAYDA S. BLUESTEIN, A FUNNY THING
HAPPENED ON THE WAY TO THE FORUM: FREE SPEECH ISSUES WITH GOVERNMENT
WEBSITES 5 (Sept. 2001) (unpublished manuscript on file with author); Dolan, supra
note 73, at 81 (“[W]here a municipality imposes no selective system of controls and
has a history of allowing a broad range of speech in its advertising forums, courts will
find a designated forum and apply strict scrutiny to invalidate all rejections of
proposed speech.”) (internal citations omitted).
93
Irene Segal Ayers, What Rudy Hasn’t Taken Credit For: First Amendment
Limits on Regulation of Advertising on Government Property, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 607,
623-24 (2000).
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policy issue rather than a legal matter,94 regulation of naming rights
deals raises problems that go far beyond the schoolhouse. As recounted
in Part II, current policies give school boards few guidelines for
selecting sponsors, thus leaving them open to charges of viewpoint and
content discrimination.95 First Amendment-based challenges from
excluded sponsors seem all but inevitable.
These challenges will raise important constitutional questions
that do not admit of easy answers. Despite the First Amendment’s
seemingly clear language – “Congress shall make no law … abridging
the freedom of Speech”96 – courts have interpreted it as giving different
levels of protections to different kinds of speech depending on the
speaker, the message, and the forum where it is delivered.97 As a result,
different categories of speech receive different levels of protection.
Government speech, commercial speech, and schoolhouse speech, all of
which are implicated in school naming rights sales, are among the most
volatile and controversial of these categories. All three are subject to
varying and sometimes ill-defined tests both in terms of their definitions
and the standards to which they are held. When a school sells the
naming rights to its facilities, who is the “speaker”? Is it the school on
which the name is emblazoned, or the person or entity to whom the
name belongs? And moreover, what is the message being delivered? Is it
a simple “thank you” to a benefactor, or a commercial advertising pitch?
If the latter, is it the school or the sponsor who is pushing the sponsor’s
products? Even if those questions could be easily resolved, they would
94

D. Russakoff, Finding the Wrongs in Naming Rights; School Gym Sponsorship
Sparks Furor, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2001, at A3 (quoting school board director of
corporate development as saying, “We’re not violating their [students’] rights. We’re
getting them a gym.”).
95
On the other hand, “proprietary” regulations on naming rights deals –
restrictions that require contracts of a certain length, or provide deals on a first-come
first-served basis, are likely to be upheld. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,
418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (finding that a city acting in its proprietary capacity could
make reasonable choices concerning the type of advertising displayed in its public
transit vehicles); Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. Metro. Sports Facilities Comm’n, 797
F.2d 552 (8th Cir. 1986).
96
U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
97
Many scholars have called for a more evenhanded application of the
Amendment. See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of
Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1384 (2001) (arguing that “there is no
basis or need for any special form of privilege or immunity for government speech.”);
Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV.
627 (1990); William Van Alstyne, To What Extent Does the Power of Government to
Determine the Boundaries and Conditions of Lawful Commerce Permit Government to
Declare Who May Advertise and Who May Not?, 51 EMORY L.J. 1513, 1554 (2002)
[hereinafter Van Alstyne, Power of Government].
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leave the difficult problem of the forum: What does it matter that these
naming rights deals take place on school grounds? And perhaps most
difficult of all, how are courts to resolve all of these questions at once?
This swirl of questions draws together the cloudy jurisprudence
surrounding government speech, commercial speech, and speech in
schools. This final Part uses school naming rights as a lens through
which to examine these three areas of First Amendment law, in an
attempt to clarify their elusive meanings by sketching the ill-defined and
sometimes porous boundaries between them. It points out connections
and overlaps where they exist, and argues that the boundaries between
these three categories can never be resolved so long as each of them is
focused not just on a different answer, but on a different question.
A. School Naming Rights as Government Speech: Speaker-Based
Classification
When sorting through the potential “speakers” involved in public
school naming rights deals, the natural place to start is with the school
itself. As the naming polices described above demonstrate, many school
boards see the selection of a school’s name as an important opportunity
to send a message about the school or the community. Indeed, naming
policies exist specifically because school boards want to control that
message, whether it is acknowledgement of a community leader or
simply recognition of a community landmark or feature. That motivation
applies with equal force when selecting or rejecting paid sponsors:
School boards might want to avoid “bad” sponsors because in effect
they are watching their own mouths, and do not want to send a bad
message to their students. If school boards are the ones actually
“speaking” for the purposes of the First Amendment, then their
sponsorship decisions may be considered “government speech.” This
Section assesses the government speech standard and applies it to the
issue of school naming rights.
1. Defining and Regulating Government Speech
Government speech as a First Amendment concept has a
complicated family tree.98 It evolved in a series of cases involving
98

Note, The Curious Relationship Between the Compelled Speech and
Government Speech Doctrines, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2411, 2432 (2004) (“The
government speech line of cases remains the ugly stepchild of First Amendment
doctrine.”). The First Amendment family picture has often been painted in such stark
terms. See, e.g., William Van Alstyne, Remembering Melville Nimmer: Some
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“subsidized” speech, which introduced the proposition that the
government can effectively “speak” through its relationships with
private actors.99 The seminal case is Rust v. Sullivan, in which the
Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to Title X of the
Public Health Services Act.100 That provision would have withheld
government funds from family planning services that provided
abortions,101 a condition which the services said violated their First
Amendment rights. Finding that the provision was not facially invalid,
the Court held that “[t]he government can, without violating the
Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it
believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an
alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another
way.”102 Rust thus suggested both a broad definition of government
speech – including situations where the government “speaks” by paying
private actors – and a generous standard to govern it: When speaking,
even through a private actor, the government did not need to be
viewpoint neutral.
The Court revisited and limited Rust just a few years later in
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, holding
that a public university could not refuse to fund student publications
which expressed belief in a deity.103 On its face, Rosenberger seemed
contrary to Rust’s grant of broad governmental authority. Both cases
involved First Amendment challenges by private actors whose activities
the government had refused to fund.104 But whereas Rust denied the
Cautionary Notes on Commercial Speech, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1635 (1996)
(“[T]he Supreme Court is generally of the view – and has been for twenty years – that
commercial speech is not some kind of orphan left out in the cold under the First
Amendment.”).
99
The pioneering work arguing for greater recognition of government as a creator
of speech, and not just as regulator of it, is Mark G. Yudof, When Government Speaks:
Politics, Law, and Government Expression in America (1983).
100
500 U.S. 173 (1991). Earlier cases implicitly reached the conclusion that Rust
eventually adopted. See, e.g., Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm’n, 688 F.2d
1033, 1044 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
101
Based on this limitation, some have described Rust as a constitutional
conditions case rather than a government speech case. See, e.g., Robert C. Post,
Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 169 (1996).
102
500 U.S. at 193.
103
515 U.S. 819 (1995). Although scholars tend to identify Rosenberger as a pillar
of government speech doctrine, the Court actually approached Rosenberger through
the lens of forum analysis. Id. at 829-831. This Article addresses public forum analysis
in more detail in Part III.C.
104
See also Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998)
(upholding, against a viewpoint discrimination challenge, NEA grant-making
procedures which funded some constitutionally protected activities but not others).

124

JOSEPH BLOCHER

Vol __:__

challenge, citing the broad discretion of the government as a speaker,
Rosenberger found that the refusal to fund student publications was not
government speech, and thus not entitled to the same deference. Justice
Kennedy, citing Rust, wrote in Rosenberger that a state may regulate the
content of speech when it is the speaker or when it enlists private
entities to convey its message, but that it cannot discriminate on the
basis of viewpoint when subsidizing private speakers delivering their
own messages.105 The key difference between Rust and Rosenberger,
then, lay in understanding whose message was really at issue: In Rust,
the government enlisted private actors to deliver its own message,
whereas in Rosenberger it attempted to discourage certain private
viewpoints.106 Justice Kennedy repeated this distinction in Legal
Services Corp. v. Velazquez, again reading Rust as protecting the
government’s right to engage in viewpoint discrimination when it
speaks, but not when subsidizes private speakers.107 The rationale
behind this rule derives from basic democratic principles: “When the
government speaks, for example to promote its own policies or advance
a particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and the
political process for its advocacy.”108 Extrapolating to the naming rights
context, one might say that the “government speech” of school board
officials who enter into objectionable naming rights deals can always be
checked at the next school board election.109
105

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833. Latino Officers Ass’n v. New York, 196 F.3d
458, 468 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting, in dicta, that “the government may regulate its own
expression in ways that would be unconstitutional were a private party the speaker”),
cert denied, 528 U.S. 1159 (2000).
106
Later cases suggested, but did not hold, that the religious content of the
disputed speech was behind the Court’s determination in Rosenberger. Good News
Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112 (2001) (“[W]e reaffirm our holdings in
Lamb’s Chapel and Rosenberger that speech discussing otherwise permissible
subjects cannot be excluded from a limited public forum on the ground that the subject
is discussed from a religious viewpoint.”).
107
531 U.S. 533 (2001) (overturning statute which provided government funding
for public interest lawyers on the condition that the lawyers not challenge welfare
policy); see also Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113 (1895) (Holmes, J.), aff’d sub
nom. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897) (“For the legislature absolutely
or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an
infringement of rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a private house
to forbid it in the house.”). But see Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
108
Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541-42 (quoting Bd. Of Regents of the Univ. of Wis.
Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000)); see also Johann v. Livestock
Marketing Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 563-64 (2005).
109
Of course this solution is imperfect, since naming rights contracts are unlikely
to respect the local election cycle, and the ultimate decisions about naming rights deals
– at least small ones – might be made by unelected school officials like school
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The tenuous distinctions drawn in Rust and Rosenberger left
many scratching their heads about what constitutes government
speech,110 and courts have struggled mightily to identify it.111 Scholars,
too, acknowledge that Rust and Rosenberger’s subsidized speech
analysis does not fit easily into any particular First Amendment
framework. As Robert Post pithily notes,
Subsidized speech challenges two fundamental
assumptions of ordinary First Amendment doctrine. It
renders uncertain the status of speakers, forcing us to
determine whether speakers should be characterized as
independent participants in the formation of public
opinion or instead as instrumentalities of the government.
And it renders uncertain the status of government action,
forcing us to determine whether subsidies should be
characterized as government regulations imposed on
persons or instead as a form of government participation
in the marketplace of ideas.112
As a result, the subsidized speech cases do not provide a particularly
good indication of how courts will treat government speech challenges
in school naming rights and other sponsorship cases.113 Rosenberger
indicates that the relevant inquiry is whether the message in any
particular case is the government’s, even if it is delivered by a private
speaker. In the case of public school naming rights, however, identifying
the “message” sent by a school’s name raises complicated issues of
language and meaning that admit no easy answers.
principals.
110
Bezanson & Buss, supra note 97, at 1382 (“More fundamentally, the RustRosenberger distinction relied upon in Velazquez doesn’t work because it rests on an
incoherent theoretical premise, and lacks a clear understanding of government speech
under the Constitution.”); Note, The Curious Relationship Between the Compelled
Speech and Government Speech Doctrines, supra note 98.
111
As Justice Scalia noted in his Velazquez dissent, “If the private doctors’
confidential advice to their patients at issue in Rust constituted ‘government speech,’ it
is hard to imagine what subsidized speech would not be government speech …. Even
respondents agree that ‘the true speaker in Rust was not the government, but the
doctor.’” 531 U.S. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
112
Post, Subsidized Speech, supra note 101, at 152.
113
William T. Mayton, Buying-Up Speech: Active Government and the Terms of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 373, 376 (1994)
(“[T]he decisions seem incoherent, a medley of misplaced epigrams (such as ‘no duty
to subsidize a right’) and dubious psychological speculations (such as when choice
becomes coercion).”) (internal citation omitted).
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Courts’ attempts to apply government speech analysis to messagebearing license plates illustrate the point. In twin cases involving
factually similar First Amendment challenges to specialty license plates,
federal district courts came to opposite conclusions about whether such
plates represent government speech. In Sons of Confederate Veterans v.
Holcomb, the district court struck down on First Amendment grounds a
legislative prohibition on logo-bearing license plates, finding that the
prohibition was targeted specifically against displays of the confederate
flag, and that as such it violated the free speech of the sponsor, not the
government.114 By contrast, Henderson v. Stalder invalidated on First
Amendment grounds a license plate specifically approved by the
Louisiana legislature which read “Choose life.”115 In Henderson, the
court considered the license plate to be government speech, and ruled
that such speech must be viewpoint neutral.116
The divergent classifications in the license plate cases illustrate
the difficulty of classifying state-affiliated messages as government
speech or not. They also illuminate one of the complicated interactions
between the standards that apply to government speech as opposed to
other forms of speech: Although the license plate cases identified
different speakers, they applied similar standards and reached the same
results. Henderson, finding government speech, required that it be made
in a viewpoint neutral manner.117 Holcomb, finding private speech,
required any regulations on that speech to be viewpoint neutral.118 The
simple answer to that apparent conflict may be that Henderson misapplied Rust by ignoring its holding that the government can engage in
viewpoint discrimination when it is the speaker. It might also be that the
Henderson and Holcomb courts intuited the same result – that license
plates should be viewpoint-neutral – and simply took different routes to
reach it.
School naming rights cases and other examples of government
sponsorship may give courts an opportunity to clarify that tenuous
distinction and explain whether “viewpoint neutral” is in fact the same
standard when applied to government speech as to regulations on private
speech. Even smoothing out this wrinkle in the doctrine, however, will
not absolve courts from the difficult task of identifying government
114

129 F. Supp. 2d 941, 945 (W.D. Va. 2001).
112 F. Supp. 2d 589 (E.D. La. 2000); rev’d on other grounds, 287 F.3d 374
(5th Cir. 2002) (finding lack of standing).
116
The court’s analysis blended, without comment, government speech and forum
analysis, thus implicitly recognizing an overlap discussed at greater length in
Subsection III.C.3. See 112 F. Supp. 2d at 598.
117
Id.
118
129 F. Supp. 2d at 945.
115
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speech when it occurs.
2. Identifying the Speaker and Message of School Naming Rights
Though the standard governing government speech is itself illdefined,119 the confusion it causes pales in comparison to the
bewildering task of identifying government speech in the first place.
Rust and Rosenberger make it clear that the most important question is
determining whether the government itself is the one with the message,
even if that message is actually delivered by a private agent.120 The
simplicity of the question, however, obscures the difficulty of its
application.121
The very idea that sponsorship deals could implicate government
speech raises complex and controversial questions regarding the
characterization of speech and sponsorship, and the relationship between
private actors and the government. If commercial buyers of naming
rights seek to profit from the deals – as common sense and sponsors’
own statements suggest122 – then it seems reasonable to assume that they
are paying the schools to send a particular message. They are, in other
119

Cf. Frederick Schauer, Is Government Speech a Problem?, 35 STAN. L. REV.
373, 386 (1983) (reviewing MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS:
LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983)) (“A definitive answer to the
questions that government speech presents would require definitive conclusions about
the effects of communication in general and about the philosophical purposes and
underpinnings of the first amendment.”).
120
Note, The Curious Relationship Between the Compelled Speech and
Government Speech Doctrines, supra note 98, at 2412 (“[P]laintiffs have uniformly
been willing to accept Rust’s definition of the battlefield: that is, the only question to
be answered is the factual one of who is speaking.”).
121
Many cases seem to have gone out of their way to avoid finding government
speech. See, e.g., Southworth, 529 U.S. at 234-35 (utilizing compelled speech
framework to analyze mandatory student activity fees to fund private organizations
engaging in political or ideological speech as a compelled speech claim, and noting
that “the analysis likely would be altogether different” if the matter concerned speech
by a university). Courts have, for example, generally rejected the “government
speech” argument in a series of cases challenging mandatory assessments collected in
agricultural industries to support generic advertising. Livestock Mktg Assoc. v. U.S.
Dep’t. of Agric., 335 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2003); Pelts & Skins, L.L.C. v. Jenkins, 259 F.
Supp. 2d 482, 490 (M.D. La. 2003); In re Washington State Apple Adver. Comm’n,
257 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1305 (E.D. Wa. 2003); Mich. Pork Producers v. Campaign for
Family Farms, 229 F. Supp. 2d 772, 785-89 (W.D. Mich. 2002). But see Downs v.
L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding government speech
where high school teachers, with approval of the principal, had created a bulletin board
for materials related to Gay and Lesbian Awareness Month, proclaimed by the school
board to promote tolerance, which included school district posters and other materials).
122
See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
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words, buying the government’s endorsement. If true, this makes
naming rights arrangements look like a form of government speech:
Whether paid or not, the government’s endorsement is the message. On
the other hand, such a broad characterization of government speech
would potentially subject all private speakers who use school facilities
to the “government speech” standard outlined above.123 If paying for use
of a government facility – whether to place one’s name on it, or to use it
actively – is the equivalent of buying a government endorsement which
is itself “government speech,” then even after-school programs would
generally fall into the category.124 This would in turn allow schools (the
governmental unit doing the speaking) to pick and choose which groups
can use the facilities, simply by claiming that the selection of
participants is itself government speech.
The case law does not provide a single answer to this thorny
problem, but it does suggest interesting and perhaps illuminating
questions. At first glance, school naming rights present almost the
reverse scenario from the major government speech cases such as Rust
and Rosenberger. Those cases involved government subsidies given or
denied to private actors attempting to voice certain messages (in Rust,
the government’s; in Rosenberger, their own). Naming rights
arrangements, by contrast, can be characterized as involving
governmental units (schools) accepting private money in exchange for
using the government’s voice to promote the private speaker’s message.
This is essentially a “reverse subsidy” – instead of money flowing from
the government to a private speaker, the money flows from a private
actor to the government speaker. That may be fine as far as it goes, but it
does not answer the primary question behind Rust and Rosenberger:
Whose “message” does a school’s name deliver?125 If the message is the
government’s, then school names can properly be considered
government speech. That theory, in turn, is only plausible if one can
reasonably imagine what message the government might be sending
through the names of public schools. At least two possibilities stand out.
The first potential message schools might send through their
names is one about the school itself or the community in which it is
123

Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Limited
Public Forum: Unconditional Conditions on “Equal Access” for Religious Speakers
and Groups, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 703-04 (1996) (“A private speaker in a
government-created limited public forum is not the government.”).
124
See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981) (rejecting government
speech characterization and holding that “an open forum in a public university does not
confer any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices.”).
125
See Note, The Curious Relationship Between the Compelled Speech and
Government Speech Doctrines, supra note 98, at 2412.
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based. Specifically, schools might use their names to either associate
themselves with or extol the virtues of a historical figure (e.g., George
Washington High) or to re-affirm their attachment to a certain
community (e.g., Durham High). The same rationale, of course, applies
to school facilities such as stadiums (e.g., Steve Turner Stadium, named
after a popular coach). This theory of school names seems to be borne
out at least partially by the wording of naming policies themselves,
many of which specifically recognize that a school’s name sends an
important message about the school.126 In fact, school board policies
sometimes describe school names as not just a matter of public image,
but as part of the curriculum. To take just one example, Rochester, New
York, has a naming rights policy that explicitly connects the naming of
schools to the schools’ educational mission:
This policy is based upon the belief that it is
important that the students and public know of the many
contributions of many Rochester leaders of the past and
other national heroes, and that this knowledge can be
more strongly imprinted through classroom discussion
and projects related to school names.127
Other naming policies explicitly recognize that “[t]he name of a
public school or public school facility should be an appropriate
representation and reflection of the school or school-community.”128
These policies strongly suggest that the districts which drafted them
have not only recognized the message sent through their schools’ names,
but actually claimed the message as their own. Extrapolating to the
naming rights context, school boards might plausibly argue that the
schools’ names represent government speech even where they are
named after private actors. Nobody thinks that naming a school
126

COBB COUNTY, supra note 81 (“The Cobb County School District (District)
recognizes that the official names of its facilities are vital to their public image.”); see
also CARTERET COUNTY, supra note 78 (“The naming or renaming of a school or the
creation of a commemorative or memorial is a matter deserving the thoughtful
attention of the Board of Education.”).
127
ROCHESTER CITY SCH. BD., POLICY MANUAL 75000, NAMING NEW FACILITIES
(revised
Aug.
20,
1998),
available
at
http://www.rcsdk12.org/BOE/PM/PM%20pdfs/7000/7500%20Naming%20Facilities.p
df.
128
HAW. BD. OF EDUC., supra note 79; see also NEWTON CONOVER (N.C.) BD. OF
EDUC., POLICY 7302: NAMING SCHOOL FACILITIES, G.S. 115C-36, -47 (adopted Nov.
14, 2000), available at http://www.nccs.k12.nc.us/Policy/Policy7000.doc. (“[N]aming
or renaming a facility [is] a significant endeavor since the name of a facility can reflect
upon the students, statff, school district and community.”).
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Jefferson High is an act of speech by the deceased president or his
estate, after all. Indeed, Rust seems to stand for the proposition that the
government is still the speaker when it hires a private actor (here, the
named sponsor) to deliver its message.129 If using a private actor’s voice
to proclaim the government’s message constitutes government speech, it
is difficult to imagine how using that private actor’s name would be any
different.
The second potential government message sent by a school’s
name is an endorsement of the person or entity after whom the school is
named.130 This, of course, is the kind of message corporate sponsors
clearly hope the school will send. Indeed, although it shades somewhat
into simple advertising, the “endorsement” reading actually seems to fit
well with the Supreme Court’s prior treatment of government speech.
As recounted above, government speech as a First Amendment concept
essentially evolved out of cases involving subsidies to private
speakers.131 The implicit endorsement given to sponsors of school
facilities could be seen as just such a “subsidy,” and – as the dollar value
of naming rights contracts suggests – a valuable one at that. The fact that
the government gives such endorsements pursuant to paid contracts does
not necessarily change the analysis. Indeed, courts have found
government speech in two recent cases involving government
acknowledgment of financial sponsors.132 Neither case, however,
identified the theory behind its determination. Some cases and
commentators have suggested that courts attempting to apply or justify
such an “endorsement” approach should employ a “reasonable observer”
129

The Court’s recent decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. C.t 1951 (2006),
implicitly reaffirmed this reading of the government speech doctrine. In Garcetti, the
Court held that statements made by public officials pursuant to their official duties are
not protected by the First Amendment.
130
Establishment Clause jurisprudence obviously offers a relevant analogue to this
“endorsement” theory. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968).
Because religious speech raises thorny complications beyond the scope of this Article,
I do not rely on those cases here.
131
On this point it is worth noting that at least three Justices have acknowledged
the possibility of government disclaimers in determining government endorsement.
Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 782 (1995)
(O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 793-94 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 818 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
132
Wells v. City and County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1140 (10th Cir. 2001) (“In
the plaintiffs’ view … the plain language of the sign demonstrates that it is a message
from – not to – the sponsors, and they assert that they are equally entitled to
communicate their message from within the fence. We conclude that the sign is
Denver’s speech, not that of the listed corporations.”); Knights of the KKK, 203 F.3d at
1093.
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test.133 And although many courts have suggested that they would favor
such a test,134 the Supreme Court all but foreclosed that approach in
Johann v. Livestock Marketing Association,135 which involved a First
Amendment challenge to the compelled contributions required by the
Beef Promotion and Research Act (“BPRA”). The Court held that the
government could characterize the advertisements paid for by the BPRA
as “government speech” even if a reasonable observer might not
understand that the government was speaking.136 Some scholars have
already decried the result in Johann and called again for an observercentered jurisprudence,137 but their proposed solution – requiring the
government to identify itself when speaking138 – does not obviate the
need to ask difficult questions. If anything, it further highlights the
tenuousness of the distinction between government endorsement of
speakers espousing the government’s position (which is government
speech, according to Rust), and government endorsement of private
speakers with their own messages (which is not, according to
Rosenberger). Does the name on a school really send a government
message of endorsement? Or is it simply the equivalent of allowing a
private sponsor to use the school as a billboard? If the latter, is that
acquiescence enough to constitute an endorsement, especially when the
sponsor has paid for the privilege?
The answer to the last question, perhaps surprisingly, may turn
out to be yes, so long as the school board (i.e., the government) played
an active role in selecting the sponsor. In prior cases, courts have
interpreted selection and presentation of programming and broadcasting
as a kind of speech. In Arkansas Educational Television Commission v.
133

See Knights of KKK, et. al., v. Arkansas State Highway & Transp. Dep’t, 807
F. Supp. 1427, 1436 (W.D. Ark. 1992); see also Bezanson & Buss, supra note 97, at
1384 (arguing that “government speech should be limited to purposeful action by
government, expressing its own distinct message, which is understood by those who
receive it to be the government’s message.”) (emphasis added); Dolan, supra note 73,
at 74-75 (“Where an affiliation resembles a partnership, so that the public will perceive
government approval of a sponsor’s message, government should retain control over
selection and the government speech analysis should apply.”) (emphasis added); id. at
123 (“What should be essential to the reasonable observer is both the nature of the
affiliation and the government’s relationship overall to the speakers in the program or
venue.”).
134
Dolan, supra note 73, at 118.
135
544 U.S. 550 (2005).
136
544 U.S. at 563-64. But see id. at 564 n.7 (“If a viewer would identify the
speech as respondents’, however, the analysis would be different.”).
137
Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS
L.J. 983, 988, 1051 (2005).
138
Id.
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Forbes, for example, the Court found that “when a public broadcaster
exercises editorial discretion in the selection and presentation of its
programming, it engages in speech activity.”139 Like the selection of an
artist for a show or a political candidate for a televised debate – both of
which are usually made pursuant to a policy and a history of active
control – a school board’s choice of named sponsors could itself amount
to government speech.140
This analogy, however, highlights yet another complication in
the analysis: What happens when the government subsidizes commercial
speakers?141 As described in more detail in the following Section,
commercial speech receives an entirely different standard of protection
than “pure” speech. Courts have up until now treated commercial and
government speech as exclusive categories, but public school naming
rights arrangements make it hard to maintain that distinction. Courts
might classify school naming rights as government speech, as
commercial speech, or – perhaps most intriguing of all – acknowledge
the overlap between the two categories and attempt to reconcile the
definitions and standards that govern them. This Section’s discussion of
government speech and the following Section’s treatment of commercial
speech address the first two possibilities. The third possibility, however,
raises difficult and unanswered questions about the boundaries between
government and commercial speech, and the appropriate standards
governing each.
As described above, the standard First Amendment prohibition on
viewpoint discrimination does not apply to government speech. But
commercial speech doctrine – explored in more detail in the following
section – does prohibit viewpoint discrimination, allowing regulations
only to the degree that they directly advance a substantial government
interest and are no more extensive than necessary to serve that
interest.142 In cases of “commercial” government speech where both
standards are simultaneously implicated, which would control? It is
certainly plausible that commercial speech remains just that even if the
government is the speaker. But on the other hand, the Court has
suggested that “commercial” speech by a religiously-affiliated speaker is
139

523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998); see also Finley, 524 U.S. at 585-86 (1998) (finding
that viewpoint neutrality is not required in selection of art exhibits for public funding).
140
Dolan, supra note 73, at 110 (citations omitted).
141
The same problem does not arise under the first potential reading of the
government message – that the school’s name sends a message about the school itself –
because government speech is the only feasible categorization for that kind of
message.
142
See infra Part III.B.1.
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entitled to some heightened level of protection.143 Indeed, the core of
government speech doctrine – that the relevant question is whose
message is being delivered, not who delivers it – seems to support the
commercial-religious analogy. Rust and its progeny demonstrate that
private actors can deliver government speech. They also seem to imply
the corollary: If the focus is on the message, not the messenger, then just
as non-government actors are not precluded from delivering government
speech, the government is not necessarily limited to it. The sponsorship
scenario thus opens up the possibility of the government delivering a
private party’s message. The growing prevalence of sponsorship deals
and other public-private partnerships has made this possibility
increasingly hard to ignore. What remains unclear, however, is which
standard – government speech or commercial speech – should govern. If
both standards were applied simultaneously, it seems clear that the
government speech standard would trump the more speech-protective
commercial speech standard,144 thus giving the government same broad
power to control government-commercial speech as it has over all other
government speech. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that the government
would be more limited when engaged in government speech with
commercial content than it would be when making government speech
with political content, such as the speech involved in Rust.
3. School Naming Rights as Compelled Speech
The Supreme Court has held that there is no
significant difference between compelled speech
silence,145 and has suggested that a particular speech
subject to scrutiny as compelled speech even if it
143

constitutionally
and compelled
act may still be
is classified as

In Murdock v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court found that Jehovah’s
Witnesses’ door-to-door proselytizing and distribution of literature – some of which
was available for purchase – was religious speech rather than commercial speech. 319
U.S. 105, 108-11 (1943). This was a crucial holding for the Witnesses, since
commercial speech received no protection whatsoever at the time. The opinion noted
that not all religious activity is protected by the First Amendment, id. at 109-110, but
that distribution of religious literature for purchase was no more a “commercial”
venture than passing the collection plate in church. Id. at 111. See also Largent v.
Texas, 318 U.S. 418, 422 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 414-18 (1943).
Although I do not address the argument in any detail here, these cases seem to imply
that religious speech, like government speech, is primarily defined by the speaker’s
identity.
144
See infra notes 185-201 and accompanying text.
145
Riley, 487 U.S. at 796-97; Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)
(holding that the First Amendment’s guarantees “include[] both the right to speak
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all”).
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government speech.146 Indeed, students have successfully challenged
particular school requirements on exactly those grounds. In West
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,147 the Court invalidated a state
law requiring all children in public schools to salute and pledge
allegiance to the flag, holding that that the law required an affirmation
of belief148 and thus violated the First Amendment. Justice Jackson held
for the Court:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any
circumstances which permit an exception, they do not
now occur to us.149
A school’s name may not be freighted with quite the same “belief”
structure as the pledge of allegiance or flag, but it is easy to imagine that
a sponsor’s identity could be just as controversial as the flag or the
pledge of allegiance. As the debate about school commercialism and the
‘Coke Day’ incident demonstrates,150 many students consider corporate
branding to be a matter of political and social import. So far, most
objections to the practice have centered on the prevalence of advertising
in schools. Naming rights, however, could take the issue into a new
realm by forcing students to not only observe corporate advertisements
in the hallways but to carry them around on their transcripts. A student
who strongly opposed a particular corporate sponsor might argue that
being forced to acknowledge or support that sponsor amounted to a
compelled acknowledgement or endorsement of the sponsor on the
student’s part, since she must not only attend the named facility but
perhaps also wear school uniforms or sports jerseys bearing the
sponsor’s name. In that respect, students, too, may have speech rights
which are implicated by naming rights arrangements.
Even though it may be impossible to predict how any particular
naming rights policy will be categorized, the framework described here
146

See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717.
319 U.S. 624 (1943). But see Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance
Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 451, 469, 473-75 (1995) (suggesting that if reasonable
observers would understand the action as being compelled, it would not be not
expressive and not truly “speech”).
148
319 U.S. at 633.
149
Id. at 642.
150
See supra notes 7-11.
147
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does identify some of the factors on which courts are likely to rely. The
single most important factor will probably be the degree of control that
school boards exert over their names. As in the programming-selection
cases, an active role in sponsor selection – especially when done
pursuant to a written policy – is the easiest way for a school board to
claim ownership over the message sent by its schools’ names. Boards
which actively select sponsors and tightly control the presentation of
their names are most likely to be characterized as government speakers.
This is potentially a bad result for would-be sponsors, because it gives
school boards wide discretion to reject sponsors based even on the
“viewpoint” those sponsors express. Sponsors are thus likely to counter
the government speech characterization by arguing that naming rights
are their own private speech – whether commercial or otherwise – and
thus entitled to heightened protection. The following Section considers
the viability that argument.
B. School Naming Rights as Commercial Speech: Content-Based
Classification
Whereas the government speech standard appears to apply with
equal force no matter what kind of speech the government engages in,
private actors’ speech is regulated by a variety of different standards
depending on the content of the speech151 rather than just the identity of
the speaker.152 In the school naming rights context, the most prominent
non-governmental speakers are the sponsors themselves, most of whom
are commercial actors pursuing commercial interests. And in an
unsteady and somewhat unpredictable line of cases, the Supreme Court
held that restrictions on “commercial speech” are subject to a form of
intermediate scrutiny. This Section gives a brief overview of the illdefined category of commercial speech and the protections to which it is
entitled, then assesses whether school naming rights fit into that
category. In doing so, it highlights some of the problematic border
disputes between commercial speech, government speech, and forum
analysis.

151

The following Section on forum analysis addresses the relevance of the
speaker’s location.
152
Of course, a speaker’s identity may be relevant for determining the content of
its speech. Commercial entities are to some degree presumed to engage in commercial
speech, but not necessarily exclusively so. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying
text and infra notes 171 & 204 and accompanying text.
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1. The Definition and Protection of Commercial Speech
Over the past few decades, the Supreme Court has created and
expanded First Amendment protection for commercial speech in two
ways: First, by narrowing its definition – thus leaving more seemingly
commercial speech in the fully-protected realm of pure speech – and
second, by imposing more significant restrictions on government
attempts to regulate commercial speech. This Section addresses each of
those developments in turn.
Although the Supreme Court has never articulated a definition of
“commercial speech,” neither has it bemoaned the lack of one.153
Instead, the Court has “recited various descriptions, indicia, and
disclaimers without settling upon a precise and comprehensive
definition.”154 In one of the first and best-recognized attempts to impose
order on the category, Justice Blackmun suggested in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Council that commercial speech
is that which does “‘no more than propose a commercial
transaction.’”155 Blackmun’s formulation covered such obviously
commercial messages as price bulletins and coupons, but seemed to
exclude the vast majority of actual advertising, which generally does
more than simply “propose a commercial transaction.” How, for
example, would a court classify an advertisement for a July 4th sale, if it
included both price information and patriotic images and messages?
Rather than disentangle commercial components from their
noncommercial cousins, subsequent cases tended to extend full First
Amendment protection to such “mixed motives” speech.156 This
approach generally followed Blackmun’s formulation, which regarded
as commercial only that which is exclusively so. It also preserved the
existence of the commercial speech category while simultaneously
extending full First Amendment protection to a wide range of
153

Scholars attribute this imprecision to the inherent difficulties of classifying
commercial speech. Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial
Speech, 58 MD. L. REV. 55, 146 (1999); Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of
Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 7 (2000).
154
Stern, supra note 153, at 56; Piety, supra note 46, at 381.
155
425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Com. on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1976)); see also Thomas C. Goldstein, Nike v.
Kasky and the Definition of “Commercial Speech”, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 63, 72
(referring to this as the “most often-repeated” definition of commercial speech the
Court has offered).
156
See, e.g., Murdock, 319 U.S. 105 (invalidating on First Amendment grounds an
ordinance and license tax on evangelists disseminating a religious message and selling
religious materials and finding that the “sale” of religious literature does not turn
evangelism into commercial speech).
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commercially-related speech. In Riley v. National Federation of the
Blind, for example, the Supreme Court held that a North Carolina statute
governing solicitation of charitable contributions was an
unconstitutional restriction on noncommercial speech.157 That the
speakers in the case – professional fundraisers – sought money for their
organizations and themselves did not, the Court found, render their
speech “commercial.” Instead, the Court held that where the component
parts of a single speech act are “inextricably intertwined, we cannot
parcel out the speech, applying one test to one phrase and another test to
another phrase. Such an endeavor would be both artificial and
impractical. Therefore, we apply our test for fully protected
expression.”158 Riley thus suggested that inclusion of a partially
noncommercial message can remove speech from the commercial
category. But the Court revisited and limited Riley just one year later in
Board of Trustees v. Fox, saying that the commercial and protected
speech in Riley “was ‘inextricably intertwined’ because the state law
required it to be included.”159 Fox, by contrast, involved a university’s
attempts to ban on-campus Tupperware parties. Opponents of the ban
cited Riley and argued that the parties involved “inextricably
intertwined” messages, since they “touch[ed] on other subjects … such
as how to be financially responsible and how to run an efficient
home.”160 The Court rejected this contention, saying that “[n]o law of
man or of nature makes it impossible to sell housewares without
teaching home economics, or to teach home economics without selling
housewares.”161 Riley and Fox thus reinforce the point that the best way
to protect a particular act of “commercial” speech is not to classify it as
such.
The Supreme Court’s solicitous approach to mixed messages has
greatly narrowed the scope of commercial speech, but the category is
not yet entirely empty. In fact, the Court has come to rely on a case-bycase, factor-driven approach that occasionally extends the boundaries of
commercial speech in unexpected ways. The Court’s ad hoc approach

157

487 U.S. 781, 789, 798 (1988).
Id. at 796.
159
492 U.S. 469, 472 (1989).
160
Id. at 474.
161
Id.; see also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 n.5 (refusing to grant full free
protection to speech simply because it “links a product to a current public debate.”);
New York Magazine v. Metro. Transit Auth., 987 F. Supp. 254, 262 & n.4 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (denying full protection and finding that, although a New York Magazine ad
“inextricably intertwined” its political and commercial messages, the former was
simply representative of the kind of commentary the magazine was selling).
158
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traces back to Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp,162 in which the
United States Postal Service barred a manufacturer, seller, and
distributor of contraceptives from sending unsolicited mailings to
individuals. The Court found that its case law has recognized “the
‘common-sense’ distinction between speech proposing a commercial
transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government
regulation, and other varieties of speech.”163 Applying that “common
sense” approach, the Court found that the pamphlets were commercial
speech not because of the economic motivation behind them, nor
because they referenced specific products, nor even because the parties
agreed that they were advertisements, but rather due to a combination of
all three factors.164 Indeed, in spite of its “mixed messages”
jurisprudence, the Court found that “[t]he mailings constitute
commercial speech notwithstanding the fact that they contain
discussions of important public issues such as venereal disease and
family planning.”165
The Court’s steadfast commitment to Bolger’s ad hoc approach
has led to confusion and occasional controversy. Indeed, the Court itself
has repeatedly noted that its jurisprudence does not lead to predictable
answers.166 Controversy over commercial speech bubbled to the surface
most recently in Kasky v. Nike, a California Supreme Court case on
which the United States Supreme Court granted – and later
controversially dismissed – certiorari.167 Responding to allegations
(which were undoubtedly entitled to full First Amendment protection)
that it abused workers in overseas sweatshops, Nike published a series
of “editorial advertisements,” press releases, and letters sent to
newspapers and universities.168 Mark Kasky, a private citizen, alleged
that this information campaign contained false and misleading
statements made “with knowledge or reckless disregard of the laws of
162

463 U.S. 60 (1983).
Id. at 64 (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n., 436 U.S. 447, 455-56
(1978)).
164
Id. at 67-68.
165
Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67-68.
166
See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 765 (1993) (“[A]mbiguities may
exist at the margins of the category of commercial speech.”); Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419 (1993) (acknowledging “the difficulty of drawing
bright lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct category.”);
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (noting that “the
precise bounds of the category of … commercial speech” are “subject to doubt,
perhaps.”)
167
Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cert granted, 537 U.S. 1099, and
cert dismissed, 539 U.S. 564 (2003).
168
Goldstein, supra note 155, at 65.
163
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California prohibiting false and misleading statements,”169 and that Nike
could not claim the full protection of the First Amendment. The
California Supreme Court agreed, finding that the “public relations”
statements Nike made denying any illegal or unsafe working conditions
in its factories were commercial speech entitled only to lessened First
Amendment protection.170 The Court justified this determination on
three major grounds. First, it found that the speaker (Nike), was likely to
be engaged in commerce.171 Second, the court held that the intended
audience was likely to be actual or potential buyers.172 And finally, the
court found that the factual message conveyed was commercial in
character in that it made representations of fact about Nike’s business
operations, products, or services.173 The California court’s framework
set off a firestorm of academic and popular debate, most of it negative,
all of it calling for clarification from the United States Supreme Court.
174
The Court granted cert, heard oral argument, and then – as First
Amendment scholars waited anxiously – dismissed cert as
improvidently granted, sparking written dissents from Justices
Kennedy175 and Breyer176 and dooming commercial speech to the same
twilight of ill-definition it has endured since its birth.177 The Bolger rule
(or lack thereof) thus seems to be the prevailing “standard” for defining
what is and is not commercial speech.
Just as the debate over commercial speech’s definition has
continued without resolution up until the present day, so too has its
standard of protection fluctuated over the years. Under the rule of
1942’s Valentine v. Christensen, purveyors of commercial speech could
not count on any First Amendment protection whatsoever, even when
they mixed their commercial messages with “political” ones.178 In 1976,
169

Kasky, 45 P.3d at 248.
Id. at 315; see also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 n.5 (declaring difference
between “direct comments on public issues” and statements about public policy “made
only in the context of commercial transactions”); see generally Piety, supra note 46.
171
Kasky, 45 P.3d at 258
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
See, e.g., Ronald, K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Landmark FreeSpeech Case That Wasn’t: The Nike v. Kasky Story, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965
(2004); Goldstein, supra note 155.
175
539 U.S. 665 (Kennedy, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari)
176
539 U.S. 665 (Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari)
177
See Collins & Skover, supra note 174; Samuel A. Terilli, Nike v. Kasky and
the Running-but-Going-Nowhere Commercial Speech Debate, 10 COMM. L. & POL’Y
383 (2005).
178
316 U.S. 52 (1942) (upholding constitutionality of municipal ordinance
forbidding distribution of printed handbills for commercial advertising in the streets,
170
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however, the Court set the stage for an entirely new analysis, striking
down a Virginia statute that forbade pharmacists from publishing
prescription drug prices. In Virginia State Board, the Court held for the
first time that “speech which does ‘no more than propose a commercial
transaction’” is not “so removed from any ‘exposition of ideas,’ and
from ‘trust, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of
liberal sentiments on the administration of Government’” that it should
be completely without protection.179 The Court focused on the First
Amendment rights of potential patients, as recipients of this
information,180 finding that even if an advertiser’s motives were purely
economic, his speech was entitled to some level of protection.181
Having established in Virginia State Board that commercial
speech is entitled to some First Amendment protection, the Court set out
a four-step analysis to test restrictions on it in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric v. Public Service Commission.182 The first prong of that test
asks whether the speech at issue “concerns lawful activity and [is not]
misleading.”183 If the speech fails this initial inquiry, it receives no First
Amendment protection at all.184 If it passes, the second prong then
assesses whether the government’s interest is “substantial.”185 The third
asks whether the regulation directly advances the government interest
asserted,186 and the fourth and final prong measures the breadth of the
regulation to see if it is more extensive than necessary to serve the stated
interest.187 Though the second and third prongs are relatively simple for
a government regulation to meet,188 the final prong has become an
even though half of the handbill in question was devoted to a nominally political
protest). Valentine pre-dated the mixed-message cases discussed above.
179
425 U.S. at 762.
180
Id. at 754-56, 763-65.
181
Id. at 762.
182
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
183
Id. at 566.
184
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982) (holding that the government
may entirely ban commercial speech that proposes illegal transactions); Friedman v.
Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (upholding statute prohibiting the practice of optometry
under misleading names); see also Jeffrey Lefstin, Note, Does the First Amendment
Bar Cancellation of REDSKINS?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 665, 691 (2000).
185
447 U.S. at 566.
186
Id..
187
Id.
188
The Court has upheld as valid government interests the promotion of energy
conservation, Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566, the prevention of drunkenness, 44
Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996), and the protection of public safety
from the dangers of compounded drugs. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S.
357 (2002). See also Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (applying
Central Hudson and finding that Florida Bar rules prohibiting lawyers from using

1-Mar-07

THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S PERFECT STORM

141

increasingly significant obstacle. In Central Hudson itself, the Court
struck down the challenged regulation – which would have completely
banned all promotional activity by electric utility companies as contrary
to a national policy of conserving energy – as being more extensive than
necessary.189 The Court’s more recent jurisprudence, however, has
clarified that the fourth prong of Central Hudson does allow the
government some leeway in its regulations. In Fox, the Court held that a
regulation on commercial speech not need be the least restrictive
measure available, so long as it is a “fit that is not necessarily perfect,
but reasonable between means and ends.”190
Central Hudson has endured as a test, though its application has
been uneven.191 Many early cases suggested that the nominal protection
accorded to commercial speech was essentially illusory. In a splintered
opinion in Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego,192 four Justices found that
San Diego’s complete ban on all outdoor commercial advertising
display signs met the requirements for regulating commercial speech
because it directly advanced governmental interests and was not
overbroad.193 Five years later, the Court’s protection of commercial
speech “undoubtedly reached its nadir”194 in Posadas de Puerto Rico
Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico.195 In Posadas, the Court
upheld Puerto Rico’s flat prohibition on advertising about casinos.196
Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist suggested that since Puerto
Rico could ban casino gambling altogether, it was also entitled to restrict

direct mail to solicit person injury clients within thirty days of their injury easily met
the first three prongs and more narrowly met the fourth as well).
189
447 U.S. at 569-72.
190
492 U.S. at 480; see also Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 635 (holding that a
regulation barring solicitation to prospective personal injury clients is not overbroad
simply because it fails to distinguish between degrees of injury); Lorillard Tobacco Co.
v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001) (citing Florida Bar and striking down state
restriction on tobacco advertising).
191
Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, supra note 153, at 5
(“The fundamental flaw in contemporary commercial speech doctrine, however, is that
its primary doctrinal standard, the so-called Central Hudson test, is so vague and
abstract as to fail entirely to express any specific constitutional values.”).
192
453 U.S. 490 (1981).
193
Id. at 508-513 (plurality opinion) (striking down the regulation on other First
Amendment grounds).
194
Stern, supra note 153, at 65.
195
478 U.S. 328 (1986).
196
478 U.S. at 344 (“In short, we conclude that the statute and regulations at issue
in this case, as construed by the Superior Court, pass muster under each prong of the
Central Hudson test. We therefore hold that the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico
properly rejected appellant’s First Amendment claim.”).
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gambling advertisements.197 Posadas led a short and troubled life,
however, and was repudiated in 1996 by 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island.198 In 44 Liquormart, the Court held that a complete ban on price
advertising for liquor violated the First Amendment because it failed
both the third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson: It did not materially
advance the state’s interest, and in any case was more extensive than
necessary.199 Justice Stevens wrote in his plurality opinion that “when a
State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading
commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair
bargaining process, there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous
review that the First Amendment generally demands.”200 44 Liquormart
thus signaled a new and increasingly-protective era of commercial
speech doctrine.201 Having restricted the definition of commercial
speech – thus leaving more speech with full First Amendment protection
– the Court has also increased the protections accorded to that speech.202
2. Naming Rights to Public School Facilities as Commercial
Speech
Although commercial speech doctrine is in a state of flux, with
both the definition and the standard changing greatly in the last ten
years, it is nonetheless clearly implicated in the regulation of naming
rights arrangements.
The initial question, of course, is whether naming rights to public
school facilities (or indeed any other government sponsorship
arrangement) can properly be considered “commercial” speech. The ad
hoc test described in Bolger – and which the Court declined to clarify in
Kasky – makes this a nearly impossible question to answer in the
abstract. Courts are likely to look to the sponsor’s motivations and
identity, and the actual placement or use of the sponsor’s name or logo
197

Id. at 346. Students of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s jurisprudence might note the
shades of his “bitter with the sweet” jurisprudence, first and most famously articulated
in Arnett v. Kennedy. 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1974). Rehnquist nevertheless concluded
in Posadas that the commercial speech at issue “concern[ed] a lawful activity and is
not misleading or fraudulent.” 478 U.S.. at 340-41.
198
517 U.S. 484 (1996).
199
Id. at 505-08.
200
Id. at 502.
201
See Developments in the Law - Corporations and Society, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2169, 2275-82 (2004) Stern, supra note 153, at 72 (“The splintered opinions in 44
Liquormart should not obscure the fact that this decision heralded a more protective
attitude toward commercial speech.”).
202
See, e.g., Lorillard, 533 U.S. 525; see also Note, Making Sense of Hybrid
Speech, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2836, 2854 (2005); Stern, supra note 153, at 58.
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in the school. For example, an individual’s name – even one like Ken
Lay’s which is closely connected to a company’s – would probably be
classified as noncommercial speech, since it does not specifically
identify a product being sold. On the other hand, a company (or even
individual, such as Calvin Klein) which shares a name with the product
it sells would be in a more questionable position. The analysis gets even
more complicated when one considers the impact of logos, which make
even an otherwise-innocuous naming rights deal into something more
commercial.203 Thus naming rights to Nike High School might be
classified as noncommercial speech, but if the Nike swoosh logo were
added, the effect would undoubtedly be commercial.204
Nike and other would-be sponsors, however, might argue that
commercial speech, unlike government speech, is not a category whose
boundaries are defined by the identity of the speaker alone. Bolger may
not provide a single, overarching test for classifying commercial speech,
but it does suggest that courts must consider the speaker’s message,
audience and motivations as well.205 Balancing these factors is no easy
task. As discussed above,206 most sponsors enter into naming rights
deals for commercial purposes. Indeed, naming rights deals are in many
ways perfectly representative of modern advertising, which is less
concerned with making explicit claims about products (as envisioned by
Justice Blackmun’s formulation in Virginia State Board) than with
creating positive associations in the minds of potential consumers.
Scholars of advertising have long recognized that “[s]ponsorship is an
integral part of modern marketing, which seeks to integrate commercial
products into all aspects of social interactions, creating cultural icons
and symbols.”207
Traditional “product identification” advertising is vanishingly
rare. Indeed, “[a] great deal – perhaps almost all – corporate advertising
expression does not have anything at all to do with the transmission of
203

Note, Making Sense of Hybrid Speech, supra note 202, at 2849. (“Despite their
expressive characteristics and similarities to both commercial speech and expressive
conduct, exterior product designs currently do not receive any First Amendment
protection.”).
204
See id. at 2839 n.14.
205
Nor would motivation alone be sufficient. Even if we “assume that the
advertiser’s interest is a purely economic one” that fact alone “hardly disqualifies him
from protection under the First Amendment.” Virginia State Board, 425 U.S. at 762.
206
See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
207
STACY SAETTA & JIM MOSHER, PAC. INST. FOR RESEARCH AND EVALUATION,
CAN A LOCAL ORDINANCE LIMIT ALCOHOL SPONSORSHIP AND ADVERTISING? AN
INTRODUCTION
1,
available
at
http://camy.org/action/pdf/SponsorshipOrdinanceSummary.pdf (last visited Oct. 15,
2006).
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information. It has rather to do with the creation of emotional
associations, especially associations that will help induce a favorable,
and even a desirous, attitude towards the product in question.”208 But
while advertising itself has changed greatly over the years, commercial
speech doctrine remains faithfully wedded to outdated indicia of
commercialism such as product placement and price information. Those
factors, which essentially echo Justice Blackmun’s Virginia Board
definition, are increasingly divorced from what most companies
consider to be advertising. If the definition of commercial speech
remains so limited, not only will naming rights fall outside of its realm,
but its defenders may find themselves manning the ramparts of an empty
castle.
Naming rights cases would, however, offer courts an intriguing
opportunity to suggest a new framework for adjudicating “mixed
message” speech. Such “mixed” speech is becoming increasingly
common, as corporations enter into naming rights deals and other public
relations actions intended to help the company’s bottom line
commercially but which could also very easily be described as political
or even charitable.209 The dispute over Nike’s speech in Kasky illustrates
the point and the context quite clearly,210 and highlights the difficult
questions courts face when resolving mixed motive speech cases. Must
courts continue to classify each act of speech as completely commercial
or noncommercial, or can a single act of speech be broken down into
separate messages that are governed by different standards? In the
naming rights context, answering this question could lead to very
interesting results. A court might find, for example, that a corporate
donor’s gift to a school is charitable noncommercial speech which is
entitled to full First Amendment protection, but that emblazoning the
208

ROGER A. SHINER, FREEDOM OF COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION 308 (2003); see
also Piety, supra note 46, at 371; Scot Silverglate, Comment, Subliminal Perception
and the First Amendment: Yelling Fire in a Crowded Mind?, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1243, 1261 n.153 (1990) (citing VANCE PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS 7-8
(1957) (quoting Louis Cheskin)).
209
See generally Piety, supra note 46.
210
Nike essentially argued that its statements feel well outside of even a broad
definition of commercial speech, and additionally suggested that the definition of
commercial speech might be limited to speech that “addresses the qualities of a
product as such (like its price availability, or suitability)” and appears in an
“advertisement” or “product label.” Brief for Petitioner Nike Corp. at 21, Nike v.
Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (02-575); see also id., 6, 24, 27, 30, 35, 36. Kasky’s
response echoed the California Supreme Court opinion, arguing inter alia that Nike’s
statements provided consumers with information to aid their buying decisions, and was
intended to induce purchases of Nike products. Brief for Respondent Mark Kasky at
29-36, Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (02-575), 2002 U.S. Briefs 575.
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donor’s name on the side of the building is commercial speech, or even,
as suggested in Part III.A, government speech.
After the detail-dependent classification question is resolved, the
next question will be whether school boards’ attempts to regulate
naming rights pass Central Hudson’s four-prong test. The first prong is
unlikely to be relevant, since sponsors’ messages are generally neither
illegal nor misleading. School boards should also be able to easily meet
the second prong by showing that the government’s interest in
regulating naming rights is derived from its “substantial” interest in
public education.211 As in recent cases such as 44 Liquormart, the real
action in the application of Central Hudson would likely come at the
third and fourth prongs. The third prong of Central Hudson asks
whether the regulation at issue directly advances the government interest
asserted, and it is here that a school board would be well-served to
revisit the decades-old battles over commercialism in schools, and the
reams of information it generated regarding the effect of advertising on
children and commercialism’s impact on school’s educational
missions.212 That debate would echo loudly in the naming rights context.
The fourth prong – overbreadth, which doomed the regulation in
Central Hudson itself – will also be particularly relevant in naming
rights cases. Prior to 44 Liquormart, overbreadth was almost impossible
to establish, as the Supreme Court repeatedly upheld total bans on
certain classes of advertisements.213 But 44 Liquormart revitalized the
fourth prong of Central Hudson, making it clear that even if the
narrowness inquiry is not as harsh as strict scrutiny it nonetheless

211

See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003).
See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text. See also Seth Grossman,
Comment, Grand Theft Oreo: The Constitutionality of Advergame Regulation, 115
YALE L.J. 227, 234 (2005) (arguing that regulations of snack food “advergames”
should pass the third prong of Central Hudson “so long as the government carefully
and thoroughly compiles such evidence of the link between advergames and the health
of children”).
213
Compare Posadas, 478 U.S. at 344 (holding that under Central Hudson it was
“up to the legislature” to choose to reduce gambling by suppressing in-state casino
advertising instead of some less speech-restrictive policy), with 44 Liquormart, 517
U.S. at 509 (“Given our longstanding hostility to commercial speech regulation of this
type, Posadas clearly erred in concluding that it was ‘up to the legislature’ to choose
suppression over a less speech-restrictive policy.”); see also Metromedia, 453 U.S. at
508-13 (plurality opinion) (finding that total ban on outdoor advertising passed all
prongs of Central Hudson, even though it failed on other First Amendment grounds);
44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 508 (citing Metromedia for the proposition that “Our
commercial speech cases recognize some room for the exercise of legislative
judgment.”).
212
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requires the state to carry a “heavy burden.”214 In shouldering that
burden, the government would do well to connect Central Hudson’s
second and fourth prongs. In other words, the court might find that the
strength of the governmental interest in educating children is so strong
(a second prong issue) that even a large degree of overbreadth is
permissible (a fourth prong issue). Although courts have not explicitly
acknowledged any connection between the second and fourth prongs of
Central Hudson, a close reading of commercial speech cases suggests
that it does in fact exist. To take just one example, in the pre-Central
Hudson case of Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,215 the Supreme
Court found that a broad prophylactic ban on lawyers’ in-person
solicitation of clients was a permissible regulation of commercial
speech, given the importance of the governmental interest in preventing
solicitees’ duress.216
The difficulty of applying commercial speech doctrine to naming
rights highlights not just the problems of commercial speech – which
have been ably documented elsewhere217 – but also the border disputes
between government speech and commercial speech. Resolving those
disputes may prove nearly impossible under current doctrine, since the
government speech and commercial speech analyses begin with
fundamentally different inquiries that yield non-exclusive answers.
Government speech analysis focuses on the speaker behind the message,
whereas commercial speech analysis employs a multi-factored approach
that essentially considers the content of the message. These are separate
questions, of course, and may result in overlapping answers: Speech can
simultaneously meet the tests for government and commercial speech.
The preceding Part suggested how a court might resolve the overlapping
standards of these categories. It did not, however, suggest how courts
can resolve the definitional overlap between the two. In many ways, that
is an even thornier question. If courts were to borrow the speaker-based
approach they apply to government speech and use it to differentiate
214

44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 516.
436 U.S. 447 (1978).
216
Id. at 468; see also Florida Bar, 515 U.S. 618 (upholding Florida bar
association’s prohibition on lawyers sending written solicitations to prospective
personal injury clients within thirty days of the accident). But see In re Primus, 436
U.S. 412 (1978) (finding that an ACLU lawyer’s letter to a group of indigent political
clients falls within the “generous zone of First Amendment protections reserved for
associational freedoms” and that “[w]here political expression or association is at
issue, this Court has not tolerated the degree of imprecision that often characterized
government regulation of the conduct of commercial affairs.”).
217
See generally Symposium, Nike v. Kasky and the Modern Commercial Speech
Doctrine, 54 CASE W. RES. 965 (2004).
215
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between different kinds of nongovernmental speech, they would likely
find the vast majority of public school naming rights deals to be
commercial speech, since the private speakers involved are usually
corporations attempting to profit from the arrangement. One might find
support for this view, ironically enough, in the school boards’ own
statements. The discussion in the previous Section suggested that school
boards might reject “bad” sponsors so that they themselves can avoid
sending a bad message. But schools’ opposition to certain naming rights
deals, like public opposition to schoolhouse commercialism, seems to be
primarily driven by a desire to avoid exposing students to a bad
message. When posed that way, the motivation for naming rights
regulations seems to implicitly recognize that the school itself is not the
speaker, but is trying to limit the speech of a private speaker, such as an
the advertiser pushing unhealthy snacks or a sponsor with a
controversial message. Though the difference may seem subtle, it makes
all the difference for First Amendment analysis, because it
acknowledges that the government is not trying to watch its own mouth,
but rather monitor someone else’s.
C. School Naming Rights and Forum Analysis: Forum-Based
Classification
The previous two Sections have considered naming rights as
government speech, as commercial speech, and even as a combination
of both. There is, however, another possibility: That naming rights
constitute noncommercial speech on the part of the sponsors. Indeed,
many sponsors and schools insist that naming rights arrangements are
simply charitable donations accompanied by an expression of support,
an essentially noncommercial act. Such speech is generally entitled to
the full protections of the First Amendment, with certain very limited
exceptions.218 However, even this “pure” speech can be validly
regulated based upon the “forum” where it is made. In the case of
naming rights, which obviously take place in the unique forum of public
schools, that analysis can be deceptively simple. When considered
alongside the commercial speech and government speech approaches
described above, it becomes even more so, since forum analysis focuses
primarily on the location of a speech act, rather than on the speaker or
the content involved.

218

These exceptions include obscenity, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24
(1973), and “fighting words,” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942), neither of which are likely to be implicated by naming rights arrangements.
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1. Defining the Forum
The acceptability of a government regulation on “pure” speech
depends on the characterization of the “forum”219 where the speech is
made.220 The First Amendment recognizes three such forums – the
public forum, the nonpublic forum, and the limited public forum.
Although most schools and school-related forums fall into the latter
category, there are no clear definitional lines between the forums
themselves.221 This lack of a boundary makes it difficult to predict how
courts will characterize the “forum” created by naming rights
arrangements,222 but it is clear that their determination will turn on a
fact-intensive review of the particular policy or decision at issue.
Traditional public forums include areas such as public parks and
streets “which the State has opened for use by the public as a place for
expressive activity.”223 Regulations of speech in such forums are subject
to strict scrutiny, and the only acceptable restrictions are those on time,
place, and manner, or content-based restrictions which are narrowly
drawn to serve a compelling state interest.224 Fortunately for school
219

For the purposes of forum analysis, “place” includes not just physical property
but even channels of communications such as a intraschool mail system. Perry Educ.
Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44-50 (1983); see also
Rosenberger, 815 U.S. at 830 (“The SAF is a forum more in a metaphysical than in a
spatial or geographic sense, but the same principles are applicable.”) (internal citations
omitted); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985)
(treating charitable contribution fund as property for purposes of forum analysis).
220
Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (describing forum analysis).
221
Lefstin, supra note 184, at 706.
222
Compare Texas v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 58 F.3d 1075, 1078 (5th Cir.
1995) (finding that the adopt-a-highway program does not create a public forum), with
Cuffley, 208 F. 3d 702 (declining to reach forum analysis, but holding that “[w]hether
this claim arises under the Equal Protection Clause or the First Amendment, it is clear
that the State may not deny access to the Adopt-A-Highway program based on the
applicant’s views.”).
223
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
224
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981); see also Int’l Soc’y for
Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992) (upholding reasonable
restrictions on distribution of religious literature and solicitation in an airport terminal,
which is not a traditional public forum); Cornelius, 473 U.S. 788 (holding that
Combined Federal Campaign created a nonpublic forum in which restrictions must be
reasonable, and that refusal to allow certain advocacy groups to participate in that
forum abridged their First Amendment Rights); Clark v. Community for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (upholding prohibition on sleep-in demonstration in a
park that did not generally allow overnight camping); Police Department v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92 (1972) (striking down ordinance which prohibited labor-related picketing
outside of a high school); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (overturning civil
rights activist’s convictions for disturbing the peace, obstructing a public passage, and
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boards, naming rights policies are unlikely to create public forums,
although it is possible that an “open” public naming rights policy – one
which accepted all sponsors with no mechanism for oversight and no
regulations – might do so. A school board which in practice failed to
exercise control over its sponsors might also inadvertently create a
public forum.225 Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized
that the way in which a forum is used in turn shapes the amount of free
speech regulation allowed there.226 Schools and other government
entities which throw open their doors to sponsors – either in practice or
by the terms of their policies – risk finding themselves the managers of a
public forum, and thus with little power to pick and choose between
sponsors.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, the government has broad
discretion to regulate speech in nonpublic forums such as military
bases227 and the sidewalks outside post offices.228 Regulations on speech
in such nonpublic forums are acceptable, even if based on subject matter
or speaker identity, so long as they are “reasonable in light of the
purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.”229 In other
words, the First Amendment does not prohibit the viewpoint neutral
exclusion of speakers who would hinder the purpose of the nonpublic
forum.230 A naming rights policy might create a nonpublic forum if it
picketing outside a courthouse); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951)
(reversing disorderly conduct convictions where petitioner was convicted for having
slept in public park without a permit but the permit-granting process was entirely
discretionary).
225
See infra notes 92-93 and sources cited therein.
226
See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding
ordinance prohibiting disruptive noisemaking adjacent to school); Brown v. Louisiana,
383 U.S. 131 (1966) (holding that a silent vigil in a public library is protected, while a
noisy and disruptive demonstration would not be); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (finding that students have a First Amendment-protected
righ to wear black armbands as protest, unless it results in disruption of school); Frisby
v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (applying narrow reading and upholding ordinance
prohibiting picketing “before or about” any residence or dwelling).
227
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976).
228
Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730 (suggesting existence of nonpublic forum, but
ultimately resolving case on other grounds).
229
Perry, 460 U.S. at 49; Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803.
230
This fact of course raises the possibility that government actors might try to
justify as “viewpoint-neutral” an otherwise invalid viewpoint-based restriction by
pointing instead to the disruptive reaction caused by the expression of that viewpoint.
A school board, for example, might reject a controversial sponsor based on the
disruption that opposition to the sponsor would create. In the words of one court,
though, “the First Amendment knows no heckler’s veto.” Robb v. Hungerbeeler, 370
F.3d 735, 743 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that possible dangerous public reaction is
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did not manifest any intent to create a means of expressive activity for
the sponsors.231
2. Schools as Limited Forums
Although it is possible that naming rights policies would be
classified as either public or nonpublic forums, public schools
themselves are generally regarded as a unique kind of “limited”
forum,232 and it is likely that their naming rights policies will be
similarly categorized. Courts have not settled on a particular definition
of a “limited forum,”233 but such a forum is generally thought to exist
where the government opens its property for expressive activity and
intends234 to make it “generally available” to a class of speakers.235 The
intent requirement is important,236 and demonstrates the legal relevance
insufficient rationale to bar the Ku Klux Klan from the adopt a highway program); see
also Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 133 n.1 (1966).
231
See DeLoretto v. Downy Unified Sch. Dist., 196 F.3d 958, 968-69 (9th Cir.
1999) (inferring and upholding existence of a “commercial only” policy that created a
nonpublic forum where school had only ever accepted commercial advertisements and
later refused to post the Ten Commandments); Dolan, supra note 73, at 126 (“In
choosing sponsors and partners, government does not intend to open a forum for
private speech, but rather to obtain assistance to leverage its own ability to act.”).
232
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
233
See generally Ronnie J. Fischer, “What’s in a Name?”: An Attempt to Resolve
the “Analytic Ambiguity” of the Designated and Limited Public Fora, 107 DICKINSON
L. REV. 639 (2003).
234
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (“The government does not create a public forum by
inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a
nontraditional forum for public discourse.”) (emphasis added); Kokinda, 497 U.S. at
730 (“We have held that ‘the government does not create a public forum by . . .
permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum
for public discourse.’ Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (emphasis added).”). But see Int’l
Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 697-700 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(objecting to the majority’s focus on government intent, and arguing that forum status
should be based on objective physical characteristics of the property).
235
Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 678-79.
236
See, e.g., Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730. This focus on
intent in identifying limited forums contrasts with the public forum analysis described
above, which focused instead on the actual control exercised by the government. See,
e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southern Nevada v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d
817, 822-23 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Hazelwood teaches that school facilities may be deemed
to be public forums only if school authorities have ‘by policy or by practice’ opened
those facilities ‘for indiscriminate use by the general public,’ or by some segment of
the public, such as student organizations.”) (internal citations omitted); Planned
Parenthood Association/Chicago Area v. Chicago Transit Authority, 767 F.2d 1225,
1232 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding that “the CTA advertising system has become a public
forum” because “CTA maintains no system of control over the advertisements it
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of the motivations and concerns discussed in Part II of this Paper.237 In
any case, once a limited forum has been opened, its lawful boundaries
must be respected,238 and a form of modified strict scrutiny governs
regulations of speech within it. Restrictions based on subject matter and
speaker identity are acceptable,239 but must nonetheless be “narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest while leaving open
ample alternatives.”240
Schools and school-related activities have traditionally been
treated as uniquely limited forums.241 Indeed, the Court has specifically
recognized in its leading schoolhouse free speech cases that First
Amendment claims must be considered “in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment.”242 School administrators are
thus given some constrained discretion to regulate speech in school. The
Supreme Court sketched the contours of that discretion in Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School243 and Hazelwood School
District v. Kulhmeier.244 In Tinker, the Court famously ruled that
“[n]either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom

accepts for posting on its system other than the general contractual directive to
Winston to refuse vulgar, immoral, or disreputable advertising. Access to CTA’s
advertising system, then, is virtually guaranteed to anyone willing to pay the fee.”).
237
Although not addressed in detail here, the focus on government intent in
creating particular forums may be roughly analogous to the government speech
inquiry’s focus on identifying the government’s underlying voice.
238
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829. There is obviously something of a bootstrapping
issue here, in that the classification of the forum, which in turn determines the
acceptability of restrictions on speech, is defined in part by the existence of prior
restrictions on speech in the forum. Though somewhat confusing, this is less troubling
when one considers that the existence of an ex ante policy regulating speech generally
gives a baseline by which to judge whether any new regulation or limitation is targeted
at a particular speaker or message.
239
Perry, 460 U.S. at 49.
240
Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trustees of Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 562
(E.D.Va 1998) (enjoining, on First Amendment grounds, board of library trustees from
enforcing policy on Internet sexual harassment that prohibited access to certain
content-based categories of Internet publications).
241
Whether schoolhouse speech represents a different category of speech entirely
is an interesting possibility, but one which I set aside in an attempt to keep this already
complicated topic within reasonable bounds. Even Rosenberger essentially became a
forum analysis case after the Court found no government speech. Good News Club,
533 U.S. at 112 (“[W]e reaffirm our holdings in Lamb’s Chapel and Rosenberger that
speech discussing otherwise permissible subjects cannot be excluded from a limited
public forum on the ground that the subject is discussed from a religious viewpoint.”).
242
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
243
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
244
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
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of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,”245 and that the fear of
possible disturbance caused by students’ anti-war armbands was by
itself insufficient to constitutionally justify a school’s viewpoint
discrimination in prohibiting the armbands.246 The implicit
acknowledgement that the First Amendment rights of students in public
schools “are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in
other settings” was confirmed in Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser,247 which held that a school need not tolerate student speech that
interferes with its “basic educational mission.”248 Specifically, the Court
held in Fraser that a student could be subject to discipline for delivering
a speech at a school assembly that was “sexually explicit” but not
legally obscene, since the school was entitled to “dissociate itself” from
the speech in order to demonstrate that its sexually explicit content was
“wholly inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of public school
education.”249 Two years later, Hazelwood elaborated and clarified
Fraser. In Hazelwood, a high school principal removed two
controversial articles from the school newspaper on the grounds that the
students who wrote them had not mastered certain requirements of the
journalism curriculum, and that the articles would threaten both the
privacy of other students and the legal, moral, and ethical obligations of
the writers.250 The Court found that “we cannot reject as unreasonable
Principal Reynolds’ conclusion that neither the pregnancy article nor the
divorce article was suitable for publication” and that “no violation of
First Amendment rights occurred.”251 Hazelwood thus stands for the
proposition that materials to which students might be exposed can be
regulated in some circumstances, especially for curricular purposes.252 It
also extends beyond school newspapers, to include other means of
expression which bear the “imprimatur” of the school.253
Even though Hazelwood established that the government is
entitled to some discretion in regulating speech in schoolhouse limited
245

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
Id. at 509.
247
478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
248
Id. at 685.
249
Id. at 685-86.
250
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 276.
251
Id.
252
Id. at 261. This point regarding curriculum obviously raises a parallel with the
earlier discussion of naming rights as curricula, supra note 127-128, which cast their
curricular value as indicative of government speech. Nevertheless, Bezanson and Buss
write, Hazelwood “did not rest on a clearly defined idea of government speech” but
rather “on doctrines premised on government’s role as regulator.” Bezanson & Buss,
supra note 97, at 1418.
253
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 269.
246
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forums, such regulations are not immune from attack. In Lamb’s Chapel
v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, the Supreme Court
found that after-school use of school property created a limited forum,254
and that banning all religious activities from that forum constituted
viewpoint discrimination255 rather than the kind of subject matter
regulations which are acceptable in a limited forum. Applied to the
context of naming rights, Lamb’s Chapel obviously raises the question
of whether school boards, having opened a limited forum by accepting
some naming rights deals, could legitimately reject all religious (or
undesirable for other reasons) sponsors without running afoul of the
First Amendment.256 There is no clear answer to that question. It seems
reasonable that Lamb’s Chapel was based in large part on the Court’s
solicitousness of religious freedom, since in Metromedia (a commercial
speech case) the Court upheld a complete ban on all outdoor commercial
advertising in San Diego.257 The fact that schools – which are certainly
more “limited” forums than the city of San Diego – cannot ban religious
groups from their facilities is most easily explained by reference to the
content of the speech involved in both cases.
As Lambs Chapel and the discussion of commercial speech in
the following Subsection illustrate, attempts to apply limited public
forum analysis to naming rights arrangements can be further
complicated by the kind of speech such naming rights are though to
constitute. The logic of Lamb’s Chapel suggests that religious sponsors
represent a “viewpoint” rather than a “subject matter” and thus that
regulations on their speech are bound to fail.258 But even holding that
254

508 U.S. 384, 392-93 (1993)
Id. at 394.
256
In the interests of keeping an already-complex issue within reasonable bounds,
this Article does not address the related, interesting, and potentially mind-bending
questions that would be raised if a wealthy church or other religious sponsor were to
purchase naming rights. Such a case would implicate various other provisions in the
First Amendment, which have already been addressed to some degree by the Court in
similar contexts. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819 (invalidating on Free Speech
and Free Press grounds an attempt by the University of Virginia to limit the amount of
school funds given to student publications based on religious viewpoint); Pinette, 515
U.S. 753 (holding that the Establishment Clause does not justify the government’s
refusal to allow public display of a cross by a private group, in a public park, pursuant
to an equal access policy).
257
453 U.S. 490.
258
Of course, it is possible that the apparently-content neutral policy in Lamb’s
Chapel was in fact simply a front for viewpoint discrimination against particular
religious speakers. And as noted earlier, the Court will not countenance regulations
that are a façade for viewpoint discrimination. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 812-13
(remanding for a determination of whether the challenged regulations were a pretext
for viewpoint discrimination).
255
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issue aside for the moment, unresolved wrinkles in the doctrine
complicate any attempts to assess naming rights arrangements as limited
forums. A closer reading of Hazelwood’s intent-based forum analysis in
fact suggests that the Court’s approval of the school’s restrictions was
based specifically on its concern for the school’s curricular “forum,” not
the separate noncurricular forum created by advertising in a school
newspaper.259 This suggests that schools have more regulatory authority
over naming rights deals when those deals have some kind of curricular
value. And as discussed above,260 some school board naming policies
specifically acknowledge the educational function of a school’s name.
But as the commercial speech discussion and the concerns raised in Part
II of this Paper illustrate, sponsors may indeed have advertising in mind
when they enter into naming rights arrangements. Somewhat counterintuitively, then, the degree to which a named sponsor is motivated by
advertising and profit may correspondingly limit a school’s power to
regulate that sponsor’s message in a limited forum. Of course, as with
government speech, sponsors who play up their own economic motives
in order to avoid the government speech or schoolhouse speech label
may unwittingly find themselves classified as commercial speakers, and
thus stripped of many First Amendment protections.
3. Layering the Problem: Forum Analysis Meets Commercial and
Government Speech Doctrine
This Article has thus far highlighted areas in which government
speech and commercial speech overlap and interact in their definitions
and governing standards. This final Subsection adds a third dimension
by describing how forum analysis interacts with both commercial
speech and government speech.261
In a nonpublic forum, it is probably irrelevant whether or not
speech is classified as commercial, since the government’s broad
regulatory authority in a nonpublic forum would seem to encompass
both commercial and noncommercial speech. In a nonpublic forum,
259

See, e.g., Recent Case, Planed Parenthood of Southern Nevada, Inc. v. Clark
County School District, 105 HARV. L. REV. 597, 602 (1991).
260
See supra notes 127-128 and accompanying text.
261
See also Ayers, supra note 93, at 623-24 (criticizing court for failing to resolve
apparent conflict between forum analysis and commercial speech doctrine in the
context of public transit ads); id. at 627-637 (exploring the “ongoing muddle of public
forum doctrine and commercial/noncommercial speech distinctions”); Bezanson &
Buss, supra note 97, at 1428-32 (criticizing the Court’s attempts to draw a boundary
between public forum analysis and government speech); Stern, supra note 153, at 11315 (discussing the emergence of subsections within commercial speech law).

1-Mar-07

THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S PERFECT STORM

155

regulations on speech – even pure political speech – are governed by a
kind of rational basis review and are acceptable so long as they are
viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the purpose served by the
forum.262 Restrictions on commercial speech, by contrast, are subject to
a stricter scrutiny under which they are constitutional only to the degree
that they directly advance a substantial government interest and are no
more extensive than necessary to serve the stated interest.263 In fact, the
only way in which commercial speech doctrine is not entirely subsumed
under nonpublic forum doctrine is that the former does not explicitly
require restrictions to be viewpoint neutral.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, if a court finds that a
naming rights policy creates a traditional public forum, the government
will be stripped of nearly any power to regulate the speech and speakers
within it. In such a case, the government (the school board, that is)
would be well-served to characterize the “speech” at issue as
commercial. If successful, such a characterization would allow
regulation of speech under the modified strict scrutiny standard
contemplated in Central Hudson. Rather than being limited to strictlyscrutinized, content-neutral restrictions,264 schools could regulate
naming rights to the degree that their regulations directly advance a
substantial government interest and were no more extensive than
necessary to serve the stated interest.265 School administrators seeking to
limit naming rights arrangements could thus reclaim some of the
regulatory authority they otherwise forego under public forum analysis,
so long as they demonstrated that the regulations at issue advanced the
substantial government interest in education and were not overly
extensive for that purpose.266
On closer examination, commercial speech and public forum
analysis are very uneasy bedfellows. In a public forum, the government
is prohibited from making “content-based” restrictions.267 But in the
context of commercial speech, literally every regulation is contentbased. Indeed, the entire category is defnied based on its commercial
content (at least to the degree that it is defined at all268. This potential
262

See supra notes 229-231 (describing the standard governing speech in a
nonpublic forum).
263
See supra notes 182-190 and accompanying text (describing the Central
Hudson test).
264
See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
265
See supra notes 182-190 and accompanying text.
266
See supra notes 211-216 and accompanying text (applying Central Hudson to
public school naming rights).
267
See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
268
See supra notes 166-181 (describing lack of a workable definition of
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complication may simply be a matter of semantics, at least for those
who would argue that the whole point of commercial speech doctrine is
to carve out an exception to the “content-neutral” requirement generally
applicable to free speech regulations. And as one commentator has
noted, “the only consistently successful method of excluding divisive
public speech from a limited public forum has been ‘commercial only’
policies.”269 This suggests that courts themselves are comfortable with
policies that exclude speech from certain forums based on its content.
Even so, it highlights a tension between pure speech, which is not
regulable based on content, and commercial speech, which is defined by
and regulable precisely because of its content.
Perhaps the most interesting interaction in the third category is
where the standards governing regulations of commercial speech meet
those governing regulations in “limited” public forums. Both allow for
some regulation of speech, subject to a modified form of strict scrutiny.
And in the particular context addressed by this Article – the regulation
of school naming rights arrangements – it seems very likely than in any
given situation both standards might simultaneously be applicable.270
This would give the government the power to implement regulations for
the limited forum which are “narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest” and which discriminate with regard to subject
matter but not content or viewpoint (the limited forum standard), and
also the power to regulate commercial speech to the degree that such
regulations would directly advance a substantial government interest and
are no more extensive than necessary to serve the stated interest (the
commercial speech standard).
On their faces, it is unclear which of these two standards is more
accommodating. The commercial speech test may give the government
increased leeway, since it requires only a “substantial” (rather than
“significant”) government interest. But in the context of school naming
rights, it seems unlikely that the importance of the governmental interest
commercial speech).
269
Dolan, supra note 73, at 73; see also Children of the Rosary v. City of Phoenix,
154 F.3d 972, 976-78 (9th Cir. 1998) (categorizing citybus ad spaces as a nonpublic
forum based on the city’s prohibition on noncommercial advertising); Ayers, supra
note 93, at 627.
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Indeed, some courts have noted the issue of commercial speech in public
school forums. In Dawson v. East Side Union High School, the California Court of
Appeals found that the commercial and political messages of Channel One (a
television program broadcast in some public schools) were not “inextricably
intertwined” and that the state could constitutionally regulate them differently. 28 Cal.
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is the hurdle on which any regulation would fall – a school board would
presumably assert that education is its interest, and education has been
recognized as one of the most important governmental interests of all.271
It is certainly both “substantial” and “significant.” Thus the real
difference may turn on the narrowness of the regulations allowable
under the commercial speech and limited public forum analyses,
respectively. The commercial speech test seems more restrictive, since it
allows only regulations that “are no more extensive than necessary to
serve the stated interest,” rather than the perhaps more accommodating
“narrowly tailored” regulations available in the limited public forum.
However, as Fox and other cases have explicitly stated, the fourth prong
of Central Hudson – requiring regulations to be “no more extensive than
necessary” – demands only a “fit that is not necessarily perfect, but
reasonable between means and ends.”272 Thus it seems that the
commercial speech standard might actually give school boards more
leeway than the limited public forum standard in regulating naming
rights arrangements. In the (likely) event that a court finds both
standards applicable, it could thus decide the case based solely on
commercial speech. Put another way, even if a school naming rights
policy creates a public forum, the speech in that forum is commercial
and thus entitled to even less protection than “pure” speech in a limited
forum.
Finally, there are also problematic overlaps between government
speech and forum analysis.273 And again, the categories’ definitions
seem to collapse on each other while nevertheless pointing to different
legal conclusions. In the government speech cases, the government may
regulate speakers which it has chosen to deliver its own message.274 In a
limited forum, however, the government may not regulate speakers
based on the fact that they espouse views with which the government
disagrees. Conceptually, this is a slippery distinction. Essentially it
means that the government can regulate private speakers so long as it
agrees with them enough that it can claim they are actually delivering
the government’s own message, but it cannot control those with whom it
271
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disagrees.275 The broader the government’s message, then, the more
private mouthpieces it supposedly speaks through, and the broader the
government’s power to regulate them.276 In any case, the amount of
control the government has exerted over private actors’ speech in the
past affects the amount of control the government is allowed to exert in
the future. In the government speech framework, a firm hand on the
message being delivered – even if the message is delivered through a
private actor – increases the chances that a court will classify the
government as the true speaker, and thus entitled to control the
message.277 In either framework, then, the existence of a specific policy,
regularly applied, helps insulate the government against First
Amendment challenges.
CONCLUSION
This Article is intended not as a roadmap – the terrain it
describes is for the most part still unexplored – but rather as a compass
for scholars, school boards, sponsors, and courts faced with the difficult
but inevitable task of orienting themselves in an uncharted area of
constitutional law. Although the discussion here has addressed future
cases brought by hypothetical sponsors challenging yet-nonexistent
school board decisions, it has also illuminated a series of fundamental
concerns with the coherence of First Amendment doctrine. As Parts I
and II describe, the sale of naming rights to public school facilities is
growing increasingly popular and increasingly controversial. And as
Part III indicates, that trend directly implicates some of the most
problematic and volatile categories of free speech. The wave of school
naming rights cases, which will probably begin to crest in the next few
years, will provide courts with an ideal tool with which to explain and
clarify those categories. No matter which of the speech categories and
standards described in Part III governs a particular naming rights
275
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arrangement, school boards and other governmental entities driven by
the concerns laid out in Part I must address the gaping holes in policy
and practice described in Part II.
Why do government speech, commercial speech, and forum
analysis make such uneasy bedfellows, and what does that say the First
Amendment? This Article argues that the three categories trace their
origins to fundamentally different inquiries: Government speech is
defined by speaker identity; commercial speech essentially by the
speech’s content; and forum analysis by the speech’s location.
Assessing which is better-suited for governing naming rights is as
impossible as the proverbial weighing of a pound of nails against the
color orange. Because the categories arose in response to different
questions, establishing boundaries between them is not a simple matter
of remapping existing geography. Fully differentiating between
government speech and commercial speech, for example, will always be
impossible so long as the former is defined by speaker identity and the
latter by content. The categories simply fail to exclude each other: If a
governmental unit advertises a product or makes some other clearly
commercial statement – as schools arguably do in the naming rights
context – how should its speech be categorized? This question could
perhaps be answered in part if commercial speech doctrine were to
adopt the reasoning of the Kasky court and classify commercial speech
as that coming from commercial entities. Courts patrolling the boundary
between governmental and commercial speech would then only have
only to ask who or what was actually speaking in any given case. But
cleaning up that boundary would not necessarily make courts’ jobs any
easier – how does one go about identifying “commercial speakers,” for
example? – and in any case a move to a speaker-focused First
Amendment jurisprudence would not mesh well with location-focused
forum analysis. Courts have thus far seemed content to leave these
problematic areas of First Amendment law rife with confusion,
apparently sanguine in the belief that they are relatively harmless so
long as they were quarantined from each other. By collapsing this
artificial separation, public school naming rights demand a more
comprehensive solution, one which acknowledges and attempts to
resolve the border disputes between these tempestuous but increasingly
important categories of speech.

